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1	or	less	 Under	control	 1	or	less	 “Normal”	in	a	
developing	country	
>	1	 Serious	condition	 <	2	 Emergency	under	
control	
>	2	 Out	of	control	 >	2	 Emergency	in	
serious	trouble	
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tool	 (examples	are:	Are	there	any	drivers	of	vulnerability	missing?	 Is	 the	tool	easy	to	
use?	What	would	 you	 change?).	All	 results	were	published	open	access.	 Participants	
were	made	aware	of	how	they	are	able	to	access	the	final	research	outputs.	
	 39	
Inter-rater	 reliability	 test:	 The	 relevant	 organisation	 agreed	 to	 the	 cooperation.	 No	
formal	 ethical	 review	 exists	 within	 their	 organisation	 but	 the	 consent	 can	 be	
interpreted	as	implicit	ethical	clearance.	Ethical	clearance	from	Greek	authorities	was	
not	 sought	as	 this	 is	not	appropriate	 for	a	project	 that	will	be	conducted	within	 less	
than	 two	 days	 and	 does	 not	 focus	 on	 any	 issues	 regarding	 the	 country.	 The	 NGO	
expected	that	several	of	their	volunteers	would	be	interested	as	this	can	be	seen	as	a	
learning	experience	 for	 them	and	as	a	 capacity	building	project	 for	 the	organisation.	
However,	no	pressure	was	put	on	volunteers	to	take	part.	No	personal	information	of	
any	 kind	was	 collected.	Written	 and	 verbal	 informed	 consent	was	 obtained	 from	 all	
participants	prior	to	starting	the	exercise.	Participants	were	informed	about	their	right	
to	 not	 take	 part	 and	 their	 right	 to	 withdraw	 consent	 at	 any	 stage	 during	 the	 data	




For	 both	 stages,	 any	 inconvenience	 for	 all	 participants	 was	 minimised	 as	 much	 as	
possible	 by	 reducing	 the	 time	 of	 interviews/exercises	 as	 much	 as	 possible	 and	 by	
making	sure	that	the	tool	and	its	validation	was	relevant	to	their	professional	interests	





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































No	access	to	clean	water	 90.48	 19	 Yes	
Lack	of	functioning	toilets	 90.48	 19	 Yes	
Exposure	to	disease	vectors	 80.95	 17	 Yes	
Lack	of	waste	management	 80.95	 17	 Yes	




Insufficient	vaccination	coverage	 71.43	 15	 Yes	
Poor	health	status	of	the	population	 71.43	 15	 Yes	
Extreme	poverty	 71.43	 15	 Yes	
Overcrowding	 66.67	 14	 Yes	
Lack	of	medicines	 57.14	 12	 Yes	
Insufficient	nutrient	intake	 52.38	 11	 Yes	




Ongoing	conflict	 52.38	 11	 Yes	




Flooding	(waste	water)	 47.62	 10	 Yes	




Lack	of	disease	surveillance	 42.86	 9	 No	
Inadequate	shelter	 42.86	 9	 No	




Lack	of	trust	in	health	care	provided	 33.33	 7	 No	
Flooding	(fresh	water)	 33.33	 7	 No	
Environmental	vulnerability	 33.33	 7	 No	
Local	endemicity	of	disease	vectors	 33.33	 7	 No	
Inequalities	 33.33	 7	 No	
Political	instability	 33.33	 7	 No	
Lack	of	electricity	 28.57	 6	 No	
Illiteracy	(among	target	recipients	of	aid)	 28.57	 6	 No	
Unsafe	burial	rites	 23.81	 5	 No	
Breakdown	of	authority	 23.81	 5	 No	





Indoor	fires/air	pollution	 19.05	 4	 No	
Sexual	and	Gender-Based	Violence	 19.05	 4	 No	
Increased	contact	with	domestic	animals	 14.29	 3	 No	
Flooding	(sea	water)	 14.29	 3	 No	




Ethnic	rivalry	 9.52	 2	 No	
Seismic	risk	(dry	mass	displacement)	 9.52	 2	 No	
Landslide	risk	(wet	mass	displacement)	 9.52	 2	 No	
High	precipitation	 9.52	 2	 No	
Very	low	temperatures	 9.52	 2	 No	
Violence	 9.52	 2	 No	
Increased	contact	with	wildlife	 4.76	 1	 No	
Temporary	housing	(not	tents)	 4.76	 1	 No	
Drought	 4.76	 1	 No	
Dust	storms	 4.76	 1	 No	
De-forestation	 4.76	 1	 No	
Economic	stagnation	 4.76	 1	 No	
Competition	for	resources	 4.76	 1	 No	
Arms	proliferation	 4.76	 1	 No	
Lack	of	fuel	for	cooking	or	heating	 4.76	 1	 No	
Housing	in	tents	 0	 0	 No	










Risk	factor	 0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 Weighted	
Average	
Included	
No	access	to	clean	water	 2	 0	 0	 0	 3	 15	 4.35	 Yes	
Lack	of	functioning	toilets	 2	 0	 2	 1	 8	 7	 3.7	 Yes	




5	 0	 1	 2	 3	 9	 3.25	 Yes	
Extreme	poverty	 5	 0	 1	 3	 4	 7	 3.1	 Yes	
Insufficient	vaccination	coverage	 6	 0	 1	 3	 3	 7	 2.9	 Yes	
Exposure	to	disease	vectors	 4	 0	 4	 3	 4	 5	 2.9	 Yes	
Lack	of	waste	management	 4	 0	 1	 6	 7	 2	 2.9	 Yes	
Poor	health	status	of	the	population	 6	 0	 0	 4	 8	 2	 2.7	 Yes	
Lack	of	medicines	 9	 0	 0	 2	 4	 5	 2.35	 Yes	
Overcrowding	 7	 0	 2	 4	 7	 0	 2.2	 Yes	




9	 0	 2	 3	 2	 4	 2.05	 Yes	




9	 0	 1	 3	 7	 0	 1.95	 Yes	
Flooding	(waste-water)	 11	 0	 0	 1	 5	 3	 1.9	 Yes	
Lack	of	health	education	 9	 0	 1	 6	 3	 1	 1.85	 Yes	
Population	displacement	 10	 0	 2	 0	 7	 1	 1.85	 Yes	
Breakdown	of	government	services	 10	 1	 2	 2	 2	 3	 1.7	 Yes	
Inadequate	shelter	 11	 0	 2	 3	 1	 3	 1.6	 No	
Inequalities	 13	 0	 0	 0	 5	 2	 1.5	 No	
No	soap	 13	 0	 1	 0	 3	 3	 1.45	 No	
Lack	of	disease	surveillance	 12	 0	 1	 3	 3	 1	 1.4	 No	
Reluctance	to	follow	recommended	
procedures	to	limit	disease	spread	
11	 0	 2	 4	 3	 0	 1.4	 Yes	
Political	instability	 13	 0	 1	 1	 3	 2	 1.35	 No	
Local	endemicity	of	key	
communicable	diseases	
13	 0	 1	 2	 3	 1	 1.25	 No	
Flooding	(fresh	water)	 13	 0	 1	 2	 4	 0	 1.2	 No	
Local	endemicity	of	disease	vectors	 14	 0	 1	 1	 1	 3	 1.2	 No	
Environmental	vulnerability	 13	 0	 2	 2	 2	 1	 1.15	 No	
Lack	of	electricity	 14	 0	 1	 2	 2	 1	 1.05	 No	
Breakdown	of	authority	 15	 0	 0	 1	 2	 2	 1.05	 No	




14	 0	 1	 3	 1	 1	 1	 No	
Displacement	into	camp	 5	 0	 1	 1	 2	 1	 0.9	 No	
Low	levels	of	education	(among	
target	persons)	
15	 0	 0	 3	 1	 1	 0.9	 No	
Sexual	and	Gender-Based	Violence	 16	 0	 0	 1	 2	 1	 0.8	 No	
Indoor	fires/indoor	air	pollution	 16	 0	 0	 2	 1	 1	 0.75	 No	
Increased	contact	with	domestic	
animals	
17	 0	 0	 1	 2	 0	 0.55	 No	
Unsafe	burial	rites	 16	 0	 2	 1	 1	 0	 0.55	 No	
Ethnic	rivalry	 18	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1	 0.45	 No	
Flooding	(salt-water)	 17	 0	 1	 1	 1	 0	 0.45	 No	




17	 0	 1	 1	 1	 0	 0.45	 No	
Violence	 18	 0	 0	 1	 0	 1	 0.4	 No	
Seismic	risk	(dry	mass	displacement)	 18	 0	 1	 0	 0	 1	 0.35	 No	
Very	low	temperatures	 18	 0	 0	 1	 1	 0	 0.35	 No	
Increased	contact	with	wildlife	 19	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0.25	 No	
Landslide	risk	(wet	mass	
displacement)	
18	 0	 1	 1	 0	 0	 0.25	 No	
High	precipitation	 18	 0	 1	 1	 0	 0	 0.25	 No	
Drought	 19	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0.25	 No	
Economic	stagnation	 19	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0.25	 No	
Arms	proliferation	 19	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0.25	 No	
Dust	storms	 19	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0	 0.2	 No	
De-forestation	 19	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0	 0.2	 No	
Lack	of	fuel	for	cooking	or	heating	 19	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0	 0.2	 No	
Temporary	housing	(not	tents)	 19	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0.1	 No	
Competition	for	resources	 19	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0.1	 No	
Housing	in	tents	 20	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 No	













		 		 MIN	 MAX	 MEDIAN	 MEAN	 SD	 n	
Clean	water	in	litres	per	
person	per	day	
Yellow	 0.00	 30.00	 6.50	 10.50	 8.92	 16	
Red	 0.00	 15.00	 2.00	 5.25	 5.01	 20	
Hospital	beds	per	10	000	
persons	
Yellow	 5.00	 200.00	 20.00	 45.00	 54.70	 13	
Red	 1.00	 100.00	 5.00	 18.77	 27.28	 13	
Functioning	toilets	per	100	
persons	
Yellow	 1.00	 50.00	 9.00	 10.86	 11.74	 14	
Red	 1.00	 20.00	 4.00	 4.92	 4.95	 13	
Doctors	per	10	000	persons	 Yellow	 1.00	 200.00	 5.00	 27.31	 55.97	 13	
Red	 0.00	 100.00	 1.50	 19.21	 35.24	 14	








CHW	per	10	000	persons	 Yellow	 1.00	 200.00	 20.00	 42.46	 55.51	 13	





95.00	 90.00	 81.92	 14.88	 13	





90.00	 80.00	 73.08	 21.53	 13	





95.00	 87.50	 83.33	 12.80	 12	





90.00	 72.50	 70.83	 17.42	 12	
Red	 1.00	 90.00	 50.00	 52.00	 23.90	 13	
Persons	living	under	1	US$	
percentage	
Yellow	 1.00	 60.00	 20.00	 28.27	 22.88	 11	
Red	 1.00	 80.00	 20.00	 29.07	 25.70	 14	
Persons	per	100	square	
metres	
Yellow	 1.00	 50.00	 5.00	 13.09	 14.53	 11	






















300.00	 50.00	 79.00	 89.60	 10	
















































































	 F	 CHE	 C	 F	 GD	 PC	 RC	 TS	 T	
No	access	to	clean	water	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5	
Lack	of	functioning	toilets	 4	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5	
Exposure	to	disease	vectors	 4.5	 5	 4	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5	
Lack	of	waste	management	 4	 4	 4	 4.5	 4	 5	 5	 4	 4	
Lack	of	health	facilities	 4.5	 5	 5	 4.5	 5	 5	 5	 5	 5	
Lack	of	health	workers	 4	 5	 5	 4	 5	 5	 5	 4	 4	
Insufficient	vaccine	coverage	 4.5	 4	 4	 4	 4	 4.5	 5	 4	 4	
Poor	health	status	 5	 5	 4.5	 4	 4	 5	 4.5	 4	 4	
Extreme	poverty	 4.5	 4	 4	 4	 4	 5	 4.5	 4.
5	
4	
Overcrowding	 4	 4	 4	 4	 4	 4	 5	 4	 4	
Lack	of	medicines	 4	 5	 5	 4	 5	 5	 5	 4	 4	
Insufficient	nutrient	intake	 5	 4	 4	 4	 4	 5	 5	 3	 4	
Lack	of	health	education	 4	 4	 4	 4	 4	 4	 4	 3	 4	
Inadequate	distance	between	
housing	and	human	waste	disposal	
4	 4	 4	 4	 4	 5	 5	 4	 4	
Ongoing	conflict	 5	 5	 5	 4	 4	 5	 5	 4	 4	






5	 5	 5	 5	 4	 5	 5	 4	 5	
Flooding	(waste	water)	 4	 4	 4	 5	 4	 4.5	 4	 5	 5	
Breakdown	of	government	services	 5	 4	 5	 4.5	 4	 5	 4.5	 4	 4	
Reluctance	to	follow	disease	
control	procedures	




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3	 Group	4	 Correct	 %	Correct	
1	 quant	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 4	 100	
2	 quant	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 4	 100	
3a	 quant	 1	 1	 1	 N/A	 1	 3	 75	
3b	 quant	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 4	 100	
4	 qual	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 4	 100	
5	 qual	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 4	 100	
6	 qual	 1	 2	 1	 1	 1	 3	 75	
7a	 qual	 0	 2	 1	 1	 0	 1	 25	
7b	 qual	 0	 2	 0	 1	 0	 2	 50	
7c	 qual	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 1	 1	 2	 50	
7d	 quant	 1	 1	 1	 1	 2	 3	 75	
8a	 quant	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 3	 75	
8b	 quant	 0	 0	 0	 0	 2	 3	 75	
8c	 quant	 1	 1	 1	 1	 2	 3	 75	
9a	 quant	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 4	 100	
9b	 quant	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 4	 100	
9c	 quant	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 4	 100	
9d	 quant	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 4	 100	
10	 qual	 1	 1	 1	 N/A	 1	 3	 75	
11	 qual	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 4	 100	
12a	 qual	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 4	 100	
12b	 qual	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 4	 100	
13	 qual	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 4	 100	
14	 qual	 0	 2	 N/A	 1	 1	 0	 0	
15	 quant	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 4	 100	
16	 quant	 0	 0	 1	 0	 0	 3	 75	
17	 qual	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 4	 100	
18	 qual	 2	 2	 N/A	 N/A	 2	 2	 50	
19a	 qual	 1	 1	 0	 1	 1	 3	 75	
19b	 qual	 1	 1	 0	 0	 0	 3	 75	
20a	 qual	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 4	 100	
20b	 qual	 1	 1	 1	 2	 1	 3	 75	
20c	 qual	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 4	 100	
20d	 qual	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 4	 100	
Correct:	 N/A	 34	 29	 29	 26	 28	 N/A	 N/A	
%	






















3	 Group	4	 Correct	 %	Correct	
1	 quant	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 4	 100	
2	 quant	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 4	 100	
3a	 quant	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 4	 100	
3b	 quant	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 4	 100	
4	 qual	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 4	 100	
5	 qual	 2	 2	 2	 N/A	 2	 3	 75	
6	 qual	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 4	 100	
7a	 qual	 2	 2	 1	 2	 1	 2	 50	
7b	 qual	 N/A	 N/A	 2	 2	 1	 1	 25	
7c	 qual	 2	 2	 N/A	 2	 2	 3	 75	
7d	 quant	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 4	 100	
8a	 quant	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 4	 100	
8b	 quant	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 4	 100	
8c	 quant	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 4	 100	
9a	 quant	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 4	 100	
9b	 quant	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 4	 100	
9c	 quant	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 4	 100	
9d	 quant	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 4	 100	
10	 qual	 0	 0	 0	 2	 1	 2	 50	
11	 qual	 N/A	 N/A	 2	 2	 1	 1	 25	
12a	 qual	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 4	 100	
12b	 qual	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 4	 100	
13	 qual	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 2	 N/A	 3	 75	
14	 qual	 2	 N/A	 0	 2	 N/A	 1	 25	
15	 quant	 2	 N/A	 N/A	 2	 N/A	 1	 25	
16	 quant	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 4	 100	
17	 qual	 0	 N/A	 0	 2	 N/A	 1	 25	
18	 qual	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 2	 3	 75	
19a	 qual	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 4	 100	
19b	 qual	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 N/A	 4	 100	
20a	 qual	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	 4	 100	
20b	 qual	 2	 2	 N/A	 2	 2	 3	 75	
20c	 qual	 0	 0	 2	 0	 N/A	 2	 50	
20d	 qual	 2	 2	 N/A	 2	 2	 3	 75	
Correct:	 N/A	 34	 31	 25	 28	 25	 N/A	 N/A	
%	
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DEBATE
(Re-) conceptualising vulnerability as a part 
of risk in global health emergency response: 
updating the pressure and release model 
for global health emergencies
Charlotte Christiane Hammer1*, Julii Brainard1, Alexandria Innes2 and Paul R. Hunter1
Abstract 
Vulnerability has become a key concept in emergency response research and is being critically discussed across 
several disciplines. While the concept has been adopted into global health, its conceptualisation and especially its 
role in the conceptualisation of risk and therefore in risk assessments is still lacking. This paper uses the risk concept 
pioneered in hazard research that assumes that risk is a function of the interaction between hazard and vulnerability 
rather than the neo-liberal conceptualisation of vulnerability and vulnerable groups and communities. By seeking 
to modify the original pressure and release model, the paper unpacks the representation or lack of representation 
of vulnerability in risk assessments in global health emergency response and discusses what benefits can be gained 
from making the underlying assumptions about vulnerability, which are present whether vulnerability is sufficiently 
conceptualised and consciously included or not, explicit. The paper argues that discussions about risk in global health 
emergencies should be better grounded in a theoretical understanding of the concept of vulnerability and that this 
theoretical understanding needs to inform risk assessments which implicitly used the concept of vulnerability. By 
using the hazard research approach to vulnerability, it offers an alternative narrative with new perspectives on the 
value and limits of vulnerability as a concept and a tool.
Keywords: Vulnerability, Risk, Emergency response, Communicable diseases, PAR model
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Introduction
While health and medicine use the term “risk” widely, its 
use usually lacks conceptualisation and is often defined 
merely in the sense of probability. This approach may 
suffice for traditional individual and population health 
issues. However, in the context of health emergencies and 
disaster health, it could benefit from a more thoroughly 
conceptualized addition.
Global health emergency response operates along simi-
lar lines as global disaster and humanitarian response and 
often in concert with actors from these fields. Learning 
from the conceptual discussions underlying disaster stud-
ies and hazard geography perspectives does not only lend 
a new lens to understand risk differently but this more 
comprehensive approach would also facilitate risk man-
agement and risk reduction in global health emergency 
response and thus lead to a more sustainable response. 
This paper provides a possible pathway for answering the 
question how can disaster studies and hazard geography 
help us develop a (social) vulnerability theory for global 
health emergencies.
Therefore, this paper seeks to bridge the gap between 
the disaster studies literature and the medical under-
standing of risk and suggests the adaptation of a clas-
sic model for understanding risk from the disaster 
studies, the Pressure and Release (PAR) model [1] for 
global health emergencies. The PAR model is arguably 
the best known and most accepted model for conceptual-
izing risk in the context of disaster and emergency and 
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understanding the role of (social) vulnerability in risk. As 
such, this paper focuses mainly on the role of vulnerabil-
ity, currently an under-conceptualized component of risk 
in health emergencies.
Current uses of risk in health and medicine
Despite the mentioned lack of conceptualisation, risk 
is widely used in health and medicine and is a key ele-
ment in epidemiology. Examples for the use of risk in 
health and medicine include risk ratios [2, 3], attribut-
able risks [2, 3], diseases risks for individual patients and 
populations [2, 3], and comparisons of proportions of a 
population at risk [4]. In these contexts, “[r]isk has a very 
similar meaning in epidemiology as it does in everyday 
usage—it is about chance. It is defined by Unwin et al., as 
‘the probability that an event will occur’. It is often used 
to compare the risk of an event between groups” [5]. 
While this non-conceptual definition has merit, espe-
cially in traditional highly quantitative approaches to 
population health, it also comes with limitations. It omits 
the role of vulnerability as a key component of risk and 
as such, impedes risk reduction in less quantitative and 
data-rich situations. This paper does in no way argue 
that all understandings of risk (or vulnerability) in health 
and medicine should be replaced by a new understand-
ing, which is closer in line with that from disaster studies. 
Instead we argue that, in the case of global health emer-
gency response, an additional understanding of risk could 
be helpful both to better identify risks and vulnerabilities 
and respond to them as well as to facilitate cooperation 
with other actors in order to achieve comprehensive mit-
igation and risk reduction strategies.
Key concepts
While it goes beyond the scope of this article to give 
detailed definitions of all key concepts underlying both 
the original PAR model and the updated version, a short 
introduction to some of those concepts—namely hazard, 
vulnerability, risk and resilience—and their implication 
for the PAR model and its update is appropriate. The PAR 
model, in the tradition of disaster studies, rightly assumes 
risk to be more than just the possibility of an adverse 
event taking place and conceptualises risk as a function 
of hazard and vulnerability. This more complex concep-
tualisation also facilitates an understanding of resilience 
beyond that of a ‘bounce back (better)’ capacity.
Hazard
Understanding hazard is at the same time the starting 
point for understanding risk and the least controversial 
part of risk in the context of the PAR model and of con-
ceptualising risk. Hazard in this context is, in most cases, 
the natural component. Following the debates about the 
use and discontinuation of the use of ‘natural disaster’ 
[6–8], hazard can be understood as the only (potentially) 
natural component of disasters. Hazards exist in nature 
and society in all forms, including traditional natural haz-
ards such as geo-hazards (e.g. earthquakes or volcanic 
eruptions), hydro-hazards (e.g. tsunamis or floods), or—
in the context of this paper most important—biohazards 
(such as all disease-causing micro-organisms). A separate 
category in this context is technological hazards, which 
are not per se natural but driven by human action. The 
term and concept hazard does, however, make no com-
ment about the level of risk these hazards pose to humans 
(or animals, the environment, society, or the economy for 
that matter). In order to understand the potential risk 
associated with a hazard the dimension of vulnerability 
is necessary.
Vulnerability
Vulnerability lies at the heart of the conceptualisation of 
risk and of the traditional PAR model. Vulnerability is key 
component of risk and risk itself does not exist without 
vulnerability [9]. Vulnerability can be roughly defined 
as a function of exposure and susceptibility and can be 
applied to humans, environmental entities or societal or 
even technical structures.
Most—if not all—elements traditionally in the medi-
cal, health and epidemiology field termed ‘risk factors’ 
fall within the category of vulnerability and can be either 
on the exposure or on the susceptibility side. “Suscep-
tibility is a capacity characterizable by a set of intrinsic 
and extrinsic factors that modify the impacts of a specific 
exposure upon risks/severity of outcomes in an indi-
vidual or population” [10] while exposure characterises 
the likelihood of an encounter with the disease-causing 
organism and the level or strength of this encounter.
Vulnerability in this context plays a part in both like-
lihood and severity of disease and disease outbreaks for 
both individual patients and entire populations. The 
introduction of the concept of vulnerability is not meant 
to replace the concept of a risk factor but rather to offer 
a better understanding of why risk factors are risk factors 
and the underlying mechanisms of these risk factors, as 
well as to offer approaches to reduce the risk of diseases 
by reducing (human) vulnerability.
Risk
Risk is a complex concept made up of both hazard and 
vulnerability, even going beyond its components. Beck 
defines risk as “the modern approach to foresee and con-
trol the future consequences of human action, the various 
unintended consequences of radicalized modernization. 
Vulnerability = Exposure× Susceptibility
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It is an (institutionalized) attempt, a cognitive map, to 
colonize the future” [11]. While such a future oriented 
approach to risk is certainly beneficial in the context of 
resilience and of sustainable disaster and global health 
emergency response, the core of risk and the need for its 
conceptualisation in this context lies more within its abil-
ity to give different avenues to risk reduction by unpack-
ing the interaction between hazard and vulnerability to 
form risk. As such, Ewald’s conclusion that “[n]othing is a 
risk in itself; there is no risk in reality” [9] still holds true 
and forms the very basis of vulnerability and hazard and 
their distinction from risk.
Considering the traditional conceptualisation of risk as 
a function of both hazard and vulnerability, which also 
forms the basis of the traditional PAR model [1] risk is 
often defined as the following:
Combining this equation with the above introduced 
equation for vulnerability leads to a complex understand-
ing of risk:
This is not necessarily meant as a quantifiable equa-
tion but rather as a conceptual backdrop for understand-
ing risk and its components. However, one fundamental 
mathematical truth plays a crucial role in this equation. 
The idea that without hazard or without vulnerability 
there is no risk is central to both the understanding of 
risk and the use of the traditional PAR model as well as 
any adaptation for global health emergency response. The 
hazard side of the equation is less of a focus for the PAR 
model and thus possibilities for hazard reduction are not 
prioritized. However, within the PAR model, a significant 
reduction in vulnerability leads to a significant reduc-
tion in risk and a (however hypothetical) eradication of 
vulnerability leads to an eradication of risk. Being able 
to reduce risk by being able to target multiple different 
aspects of it gives additional options for risk reduction, 
mitigation and risk management.
Resilience
While definitions of resilience are highly contested [12] 
and the benefit and potential harm of the concept of 
resilience itself has been debated in the context of neo-
liberal society [13–15], all definitions of resilience carry 
with them at least some aspects of absorbing, changing 
and carrying on [16] as well as of recovery [17]. These 
ideas are often augmented by conceptualisations about 
resistance, absorption and restoration [6] and the ability 
to ‘bounce back’ [18] or even to emerge stronger. Schoon 
describes resilience as “a two-dimensional construct 
defined by the constellations of exposure to adversity and 
Risk = Hazard× Vulnerability
Risk = Hazard× Exposure× Susceptibility
the manifestation of successful adaptation in the face of 
that risk” [19]. As such, a complete conceptual under-
standing of risk, including its components is, if not nec-
essary, then at least highly beneficial to understanding 
and thus actively fostering resilience. Active disaster risk 
reduction enhances resilience. This holds true for global 
health emergencies as much as for other disasters. While 
reducing the hazard (the disease-causing organisms) is 
an admirable intention, it is also highly dependent on 
the specific type of bio-hazard. Focusing on the vulner-
ability side has the advantage of also offering perspectives 
for situations of unknown hazards. Thus, there is a need 
to increase focus on the vulnerability side of the risk—
including both susceptibility and exposure to the hazard. 
This approach holds the greatest promise of producing 
enduring resilience and therefore to a sustainable global 
health emergency response.
The original pressure and release (PAR) model
The original PAR model follows the understanding of 
risk as a function of hazard and vulnerability and focuses 
on the vulnerability side of risk and especially on factors 
related to susceptibility. While not clearly conceptualised, 
the original PAR model does include aspects of exposure 
but it does not directly associate these with susceptibil-
ity as a part of vulnerability. This could be seen as a cri-
tique of the original model. Due to the slight differences 
of global health emergencies to disasters associated with 
natural hazards, our adapted version explicitly includes 
aspects of heightened exposure in the progression of 
vulnerability.
Components of the original PAR model
The original or traditional PAR model defines three steps 
to explain the  progression of vulnerability: root causes, 
dynamic pressures and unsafe conditions [1]. Each step 
in the progression of vulnerability builds on the step(s) 
before and leads to increasing pressure on the whole sys-
tem. These steps, combined with the presence of hazard, 
lead to risk of disaster and ultimately to disaster [1]. Root 
causes in the original PAR model include limited access 
to power, limited access to structures, limited access to 
resources, aspects of the political system(s) and aspects 
of the economic system(s) [1]. Root causes as such, are 
at the structural level and often describe underlying situ-
ations and power dynamics that are ingrained in a soci-
ety or group. According to the original PAR model, these 
root causes can then lead to dynamic pressures, which 
include lack of training, lack of local investment, lack of 
press freedom, rapid population change, rapid urbanisa-
tion, and deforestation [1]. Root causes are mainly static 
and resistant to change within the span of an emergency 
response. Dynamic pressures are evolving systems that 
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can lead to increasing pressure and subsequently to 
unsafe conditions. Unsafe conditions include the physi-
cal environment, the local economy, social relations and 
public actions [1]. They are, in terms of traditional health 
and medical terminology, the most immediate risk fac-
tors. However, their causes lie in the preceding steps of 
the progression of vulnerability [1].
Critique of the original PAR model
As mentioned before, the role of exposure is not entirely 
clear in the original PAR model, however, it is sufficiently 
clear for the original uses. While the original model also 
lists ‘viruses and pests’ as potential hazards, the progres-
sion of vulnerability for those is slightly different. Most 
of the original factors and steps still hold true but they 
are insufficient to explain the progression of vulnerability 
towards disaster, which in this case can be defined as the 
outbreak of a disease, hence making an adaptation espe-
cially for global health emergencies sensible.
Other critiques of the original PAR model focus mainly 
on its lack of environmental focus, either expressed as 
a lack of focus on the role of sustainability [20] or as a 
lack of focus on human–environment interactions and 
the vulnerability of the biophysical world [21]. However, 
these issues have since been addressed in the second ver-
sion of the model. We acknowledge that the original PAR 
model—and the adapted version presented in this paper 
as well—certainly still has a decidedly human focus, spe-
cifically a focus on human vulnerability with an underly-
ing assumption that socio-economic vulnerability is key 
to risk. It is our aim to broaden the perspective on global 
health emergency response and a broader, adapted PAR 
model is one component of this.
The updated PAR model for health emergencies
While many of the assumptions made in the context of 
the original PAR model still hold true for a health specific 
update, they need to be critically examined and in some 
places augmented by root causes, dynamic pressures, 
and unsafe conditions that are more specific to health 
risk. The improved understanding of the progression of 
vulnerability in health emergencies has implications for 
vulnerability, risk and resilience and their conceptualisa-
tion—and lack thereof—in the concept of health emer-
gencies (Fig. 1).
Components
While the traditional root causes (limited access to 
power, structures and resources, and political and eco-
nomic systems) certainly hold true in the context of 
health emergencies the related issues of competition 
for power and resources [1], precarity [22, 23], poverty 
[22, 24, 25], and inequality [22, 24, 25] warrant further 
emphasis as root causes that facilitate the development of 
dynamic pressures. Competition for power and resources 
could be interpreted as a part of limited access to power, 
structures and resources. However, the level at which 
those root causes act and interact is different. Limited 
access to power, structures and resources arises from 
lack of an inclusive and democratic society and politi-
cal system. Competition for power and resources does 
not necessarily assume widespread access to power and 
resources. It focuses on those groups and individuals who 
have access and on how their interaction stabilises or 
destabilises any given situation. Additionally, we suggest 
considering environmental and ecological fragility. Envi-
ronmental and ecological fragility describes the resilience 
Fig. 1 Adapted PAR model for health emergencies
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or lack thereof of the natural environment and hence 
plays an important part in characterizing the geographi-
cal context. While it is not a component of social vulner-
ability, environmental fragility strongly impacts severity 
of exposure.
We see all of these root causes as based on conditions 
of structural violence comprised of historical patterns of 
underdevelopment, colonial histories, neo-colonialism, 
and neo-liberalism, which act as drivers of vulnerabil-
ity and form an integral part of the early progression of 
vulnerability [22]. These forms of structural violence and 
their ingrained stigmatization and marginalization of 
populations along lines of race, ethnicity, religion, gen-
der, sexuality, and socioeconomic status, lead to histor-
ically-rooted inequalities, which form the backdrop of 
many of the root causes, dynamic pressures, and unsafe 
conditions.
For dynamic pressure, the updated PAR model for 
health emergencies does not negate the importance of 
the originally stipulated dynamic pressures (lack of train-
ing, lack of local investment, lack of press freedom, rapid 
population change, rapid urbanisation and deforesta-
tion). However, if the risk that is being examined is that 
of a health crisis more suitable dynamic pressures can 
be found and substantiated by the evidence. We sug-
gest the following dynamic pressures: arms proliferation, 
armed conflict, displacement, violence, lack or break-
down of government services, lack of access to health 
care, and food insecurity. Arms proliferation is a direct 
precursor to armed conflict, which is arguably one of the 
main drivers for health emergencies that are secondary 
to a humanitarian crisis. Armed conflict and violence 
together foster a climate of insecurity which is conducive 
to disease outbreaks through a variety of mechanisms 
[26–35]. Population displacement leads to a lack of access 
to health services [27, 30, 36–38] and generally unsafe 
living conditions, both in camp and community settings 
[26, 27, 29–32, 34–47]. A lack or breakdown of govern-
ment services can lead to a breakdown of health related 
infrastructure including individual health services and 
population health services such as vaccination [26, 27, 
29, 30, 32–36, 38–45, 47–49] as well as a breakdown of 
other (critical) infrastructure and coordination [30, 32, 
34, 35, 37, 50]. All of the preceding can produce health 
emergencies. Food insecurity can be seen as a key pre-
cursor to malnutrition which is an important risk factor, 
both at the level of population and at the individual level, 
for communicable diseases [27, 30, 32, 36, 38–42, 49–51] 
and other health conditions [52–54].
In terms of unsafe conditions, we propose inclusion of 
the following, which are all highly conducive to ill health 
and direct or indirect progressions of the aforementioned 
dynamic pressures: overcrowding, insufficient vaccine 
coverage, high exposure to disease vectors, inadequate 
shelter, and poor water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH). 
Overcrowding, which can result from both displace-
ment and entrapment, facilitates the spread of diseases 
from person to person and is thus a key risk factor for 
communicable disease outbreaks [27, 30, 32, 35–39, 42, 
49, 50, 55–67]. Insufficient vaccine coverage is produced 
both by a breakdown of government services, especially 
population health services, and by unvaccinated persons 
being displaced into areas with higher disease prevalence. 
Absence of vaccination has for example  been identified 
as an unsafe condition in the example of the European 
migration crisis [61, 62, 64, 68–70]. Similarly, increases in 
the presence of disease vectors, such as specific species of 
mosquitos the likelihood of an outbreak and of the trans-
mission of vector-borne diseases [29, 61] have significant 
consequences. Inadequate shelter without proper heat-
ing, ventilation and cooking facilities has implications 
both for communicable diseases [30, 32, 35, 39, 41, 56, 
60–62, 66, 71] and for non-communicable health such as 
asthma and COPD especially if indoor fires are used [30, 
32, 39]. Finally, the role of poor WASH as a risk factor 
and as such, as an adequate unsafe condition for commu-
nicable diseases, has been well documented [27, 29, 30, 
32, 35–39, 41, 49–51, 59, 60, 63, 66, 67, 72–75].
What we traditionally call a risk factor in health, medi-
cine and epidemiology is - according to the model and 
seen in a more complex picture—in fact a stage in the 
progression of vulnerability or in other words a compo-
nent of the overall vulnerability. Vulnerabilities are what 
might lead to disease in an individual and to an outbreak 
or epidemic in a population.
Implications for the understanding of vulnerability and risk 
in health emergencies
This model follows the original PAR model [1] in its 
understanding of (the progression of ) vulnerability. As 
such, vulnerability becomes a function of root causes, 
dynamic pressures and unsafe conditions:
Vulnerability and its progression stem from these 
multiplicatory components. The model highlights 
the interaction and progressive nature of the system. 
Those components traditionally identified as risk fac-
tors for health emergencies are most commonly found 
in the third category, unsafe conditions. While these are 
undoubtable the most direct risk factors, focusing only 
on them risks overlooking the complex causes of these 
unsafe conditions or risk factors.
Vulnerability = Root Causes × Dynamic Pressures
× Unsafe Conditions.
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The risk from the original equation in this context is 
the health emergency. That means, in many cases, an out-
break of a communicable disease, either as a stand-alone 
event such as the 2014 West Africa Ebola outbreak, or 
a larger humanitarian crisis, such as in ongoing  Chol-
era  epidemic in Yemen. When considering the original 
equation of risk being a function of hazard and vulner-
ability, the model and its components as described cover 
the vulnerability side, with the hazard being the disease-
causing micro-organism. Recall Ewald’s conclusion that 
risk only exists with vulnerability [9]. This means that, 
while it is improbable that all vulnerabilities in  situa-
tions such as the ones mentioned above can be reduced 
to zero, the risk can be greatly reduced by reducing the 
vulnerability towards said risk. This can be done with-
out always needing a ‘toolkit’ to reduce hazard. Hazard 
reduction is a suitable method in some circumstances but 
it is not the only or necessarily most productive approach 
in all situations.
Implications for the understanding of resilience in health 
emergencies
Understanding risk in terms of hazard and vulnerability 
fosters increased understanding of how to introduce and 
increase resilience by sustainably reducing vulnerability 
and therefore risk. Complex understandings of risk are a 
first step to work towards resilience, therefore our model 
may offer benefits. Our new concept of risk and vulner-
ability may highlight pathways to the ability to absorb, 
change, carry on [16], recover [17], resist, or absorb [12]. 
It is worthwhile to explore if the reconceptualisation can 
help lead to an increased capacity to ‘bounce back’ [18] or 
even bounce back better. However, more than just con-
ceptual insights are needed in order to foster lasting and 
positive resilience. In the context of global health emer-
gencies, the insights into vulnerability certainly highlight 
and reinforce that a focus on strengthening health sys-
tems can lead to a reduction of vulnerability and there-
fore a reduction of risk. Additionally, we believe that the 
dynamic element of the PAR model allows for the con-
sideration of changing conditions—and the causes of 
the changes, as traceable through the progression of vul-
nerability—to be considered in both epidemiology and 
risk assessment, which allows for both mitigation and 
preparedness.
Possible uses and advantages of the updated PAR model 
for health emergencies
Updating the original PAR model for health emergencies 
and using it in this context could lead to an improvement 
of the conceptual and practical understanding for the 
progression from population-level risk to outbreaks and 
epidemics. It could become easier to understand how a 
situation progresses to become an emergency. This pros-
pect has direct and indirect implications for risk assess-
ments, leading to potentially longer lead times between 
the detection of an increased risk due to increased vul-
nerability and an actual outbreak or epidemic.
Additionally, such a conceptual understanding can be 
used as a basis for improving targeted risk management 
and risk reduction interventions by providing action 
points for intervention and understanding where they lie 
in the progression of vulnerability. This opens the possi-
bility to prioritise interventions.
Combining these two approaches leads to a potential 
use of the adapted PAR model for estimating risk and 
vulnerability under alternative management approaches. 
These could include scenario planning or forecasting as 
well as post hoc analysis in order to better understand the 
value and reasoning for decisions made. This is particu-
larly relevant in contexts where situations are changing 
rapidly and creating considerable uncertainty. Thus, the 
adapted PAR model offers insights to facilitate adaptive 
management: adaptive strategies that develop in response 
to uncertain and changing circumstances.
Finally, harmonising the language of health emergency 
response with the language of disaster response can help 
foster a common understanding of concepts and facilitate 
better communication across sectors and clusters.
Limitations
Different thinking and practical implications of recon-
ceptualising vulnerability and risk in the context of health 
emergencies are difficult because risk is an ingrained 
concept in health and medicine. Moreover, the model 
does not offer automatic solutions or risk reduction 
measures. Instead, it seeks to contribute to a discussion 
on terminology and the implications of terminology for 
understanding, analysis, and action.
As it is currently built, the updated PAR model might 
be most suited to situations where general context and 
vulnerability progression are the focus rather than devel-
opment of the hazard. Hence, the model might be more 
immediately and obviously suitable to explain the devel-
opment of risk in cases of secondary health emergencies 
rather than emerging disease threats. It might be more 
suitable as an explanatory model for disease outbreaks 
in existing humanitarian crises such as the Cholera out-
break in Yemen rather than situations in which the dis-
ease outbreak constitutes the humanitarian crisis, such as 
the 2014 West Africa Ebola epidemic. We hope that use 
of our model will improve understanding of outcomes 
and add perspectives that acknowledge that underly-
ing social complexity. The progression of vulnerability 
remains a pivotal aspect in both types of events. With 
regard to emerging disease threats, the model would 
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explain only part of the problem and need to be aug-
mented by understanding other concurrent processes 
regarding the evolution and progression of the hazard.
Conclusion
Vulnerability is a key part in risk and this should be rec-
ognised in all fields that inherently deal with risk. While 
traditional definitions and terms such as ‘risk factor’ 
do not need to be replaced in the context of health and 
medicine, in global health emergency response, a more 
thorough consideration of their components certainly 
helps to understand mechanisms and pathways of risk 
beyond probability. This paper offers a theoretical model 
for renewed thinking about the meaning of risk and resil-
ience and at the same time seeks to reconcile the language 
of health and medicine with the language of disaster 
studies and disaster response. The analysis of risk factors, 
augmented with the conceptual understanding of their 
place in the progression of vulnerability, is an important 
part of understanding how global health emergencies 
evolve. The theoretical backing tentatively offered in this 
paper supports quantitative study of the epidemiological 
basis for risk factors in individual emergencies by pro-
viding a wider understanding of the role of risk factors. 
We also argue strongly for an interdisciplinary approach 
to global health emergency response. This approach can 
open new avenues for mutual understanding.
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PAR: pressure and release.
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ABSTRACT
Background Communicable diseases are a major 
concern during complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs). 
Descriptions of risk factors for outbreaks are often non-
specific and not easily generalisable to similar situations. 
This review attempts to capture relevant evidence and 
explore whether it is possible to better generalise the role 
of risk factors and risk factor cascades these factors may 
form.
Methods A systematic search of the key databases and 
websites was conducted. Search terms included terms 
for CHEs (United Nations Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs definition) and terms for 
communicable diseases. Due to the types of evidence 
found, a thematic synthesis was conducted.
Results 26 articles met inclusion criteria. Key risk factors 
include crowded conditions, forced displacement, poor 
quality shelter, poor water, sanitation and hygiene, lack 
of healthcare facilities and lack of adequate surveillance. 
Most identified risk factors do not relate to specific 
diseases, or are specific to a group of diseases such as 
diarrhoeal diseases and not to a particular disease within 
that group. Risk factors are often listed in general terms 
but are poorly evidenced, not contextualised and not 
considered with respect to interaction effects in individual 
publications. The high level of the inter-relatedness of 
risk factors became evident, demonstrating risk factor 
cascades that are triggered by individual risk factors or 
clusters of risk factors.
Conclusions CHEs pose a significant threat to public 
health. More rigorous research on the risk of disease 
outbreaks in CHEs is needed, from a practitioner and from 
an academic point of view.
INTRODUCTION
Complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs1) 
pose a significant threat to public health, 
often in settings that were already deprived 
before the disruptive event or events. While 
CHEs generally affect the health of the 
affected population negatively, they espe-
cially exacerbate the risk of communicable 
diseases including diarrhoeal diseases, acute 
respiratory diseases, measles, meningitis, 
tuberculosis, HIV, viral haemorrhagic fevers, 
hepatitis E, trypanosomiasis and leishmani-
osis.2 3 Priorities that need to be addressed in 
a complex emergency include rapid assess-
ment of the health status of the affected 
population, mass measles vaccination, imple-
mentation of water and sanitation measures, 
food supply and nutrition programmes, site 
planning, provision of shelter, non-food 
items and basic medical services, control and 
prevention of communicable diseases and 
potential epidemics, surveillance and alert, 
mobilisation of community health workers, 
and coordination with national and interna-
tional agencies.3 Several of these interven-
tions rightly target communicable diseases, 
Key questions
What is already known?
 ► Complex humanitarian emergencies pose significant 
risks to human health and communicable diseases 
are one of the most pressing concerns during a com-
plex humanitarian emergency.
 ► Complex humanitarian emergencies exacerbate 
many important risk factors for outbreaks of com-
municable diseases.
What are the new findings?
 ► While not necessarily triggering different risk fac-
tors than other emergencies, complex humanitarian 
emergencies trigger more risk factor cascades with 
interactive feedback loops and provide a conductive 
environment for communicable diseases.
What do the new findings imply?
 ► Humanitarian interventions need to be aware of a 
wide variety of possible risk factors and to identify 
those most likely to trigger risk factor cascades.
 ► While mass population displacement triggers most 
other risk factors in complex humanitarian emergen-
cies, more research is also needed on entrapment 
crises, which become more likely with the changing 
nature of conflict.
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as during complex emergencies up to three quarters of 
excess deaths are attributable to infections.4 
While research in this field is growing, there is inade-
quate understanding of the risk factors associated with 
communicable diseases in these situations.5 There is a 
strong need for a better evidence and understanding 
of the risk of communicable diseases in CHEs to inform 
control strategies and emergency surveillance, both of 
which are based on risk assessments that currently lack a 
common risk framework. We conducted the first (to our 
knowledge) systematic review on risk factors for commu-
nicable diseases in complex humanitarian emergencies.
CHEs, for our purposes, are defined as crises in a region 
or area in which no local coping capacity can handle the 
situation due to a complete breakdown of state authority. 
The problems in complex emergencies are diverse and 
a multiagency international response is necessary to 
address the situation. They usually result from extensive 
inter-state or intra-state armed conflict, leading to ‘(e)
xtensive loss of life, massive displacement of population, 
widespread damage to societies and economies’; ‘Need 
for large-scale, multi-faceted humanitarian assistance’; 
‘Hindrance or prevention of humanitarian assistance by 
political and military constraints’; ‘Significant security 
risks for humanitarian relief workers in some areas’.1 
Any such situation requires a multifaceted international 
response, usually led by the United Nations (UN). No 
complex emergency would be adequately addressed by 
the activation of only one of the humanitarian clusters. 
In fact, in most complex emergencies, most if not all 
clusters would be activated and many such emergencies 
will happen in situations and countries where multiple 
clusters are already active due to the underlying condi-
tions with the complex emergency exacerbating these 
conditions beyond the scope of an ongoing UN country 
programme.
METHODS
The description of methods follows the Preferred 
Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Anal-
yses statement as far as applicable to qualitative systematic 
reviews.6 No review protocol was published beforehand.
Inclusion criteria
For this review, we had to define three terms on which we 
could formulate clear inclusion criteria: (1) risk factors, 
(2) communicable diseases and (3) CHEs.
In order to capture all risk factors and risk factor mech-
anisms that might not have been labelled risk factors or 
been mentioned as a side note, we decided to not include 
terms for risk factors in our search strategy. However, they 
were applied as an inclusion criterion. Risk factors for 
this purpose were anything mentioned as increasing the 
risk of a communicable disease outbreak happening or as 
a reason for an outbreak having happened or as a mecha-
nism that promoted favourable conditions for communi-
cable disease spread in CHEs. Only those risk factors that 
apply at the population or setting level were included, as 
this review does not focus on the individual. Risk factors 
were eligible for inclusion if they could plausibly apply 
in CHEs.
Communicable diseases were defined as infectious 
diseases transmissible ‘by direct contact with an affected 
individual or the individual’s discharges or by indirect 
means (as by a vector)’.7
Definitions for CHEs, sometimes also simply called 
complex emergencies, are plentiful; however, as most 
agencies involved in the management of this type of 
disaster agree on some key issues, we used the United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (UNOCHA) definition: “(M)ultifaceted human-
itarian crisis in a country, region or society where 
there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority 
resulting from internal or external conflict and which 
requires a multi-sectoral, international response that 
goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any agency and/
or the ongoing United Nations country programme”.1 
As such, emergencies such as the 2013–2015 West Africa 
Ebola outbreak, the Plague outbreak in Madagascar, 
tsunamis,8 tropical storms and other disasters associated 
with a natural hazard are not classified as CHEs under 
the UNOCHA definition and therefore not eligible for 
inclusion in this systematic review.
We only included emergencies after 1990 and publica-
tions published on or after 1 January 1994. These dates 
were chosen to exclude emergencies before 1990, which 
were mainly influenced by the Cold War and hence 
considerably different in their nature. The first major 
CHE after the end of the Cold War was Rwanda and with 
those dates we made sure to include research on Rwanda 
but exclude research on CHEs during the Cold War.
We initially included all languages, but if no one in 
the research team could be found who understood the 
language an article was published in, we would have 
excluded that article for practical reasons. Because all 
articles found were either in English, French or Spanish, 
no articles were excluded due to language barriers.
Search strategy and data sources
Our search strategy was developed in discussion between 
the authors and based on previous experience and exten-
sive background reading. The search was composed of 
terms for communicable diseases, including specific 
diseases that have very often occurred in previous CHEs 
and terms for CHEs. We searched the following biblio-
graphic databases: Scopus, Medline, Embase and Interna-
tional Bibliography of Social Sciences (IBSS). The search 
strategy for Medline is presented in figure 1. Search terms 
for Medline and Embase included subject headings that 
were not available in Scopus and IBSS. The search was 
conducted in May 2017. Additionally, we searched the 
relevant websites of Medecins Sans Frontièrs, WHO and 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
the United Nations Children and Education Fund and 
ReliefWeb (UNOCHA). The search strategy was adapted 
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for the individual websites according to the technical and 
search engine capacities provided by the websites. All 
terms were searched in abstracts and titles, keywords and 
relevant subject where possible. References of included 
publications were also checked. Reviews were included.
Study selection
Based on the inclusion criteria, CCH and JB screened 
titles and abstracts of all articles identified via biblio-
graphic databases independently. In case of disagree-
ment, full text was obtained. An article was included 
for full-text review if either screener did not reject it. 
CCH and JB next screened full texts independently and 
decision about final inclusion was reached discursively. 
We sought access via libraries and contacted authors of 
conference abstracts directly.
Data analysis and synthesis
Due to the qualitative and heterogeneous nature of the 
evidence found, this is a qualitative systematic review. 
The data were analysed using thematic synthesis.9 
Primary coding was done by CCH, except for one article 
in Spanish, which was primary coded by JB. JB or CCH 
confirmed the primary codes and added secondary codes 
for all articles. Coding was done by hand and codes were 
transcribed into custom-made coding sheets, recording 
quotes, codes and subcodes. Based on the codes and 
subcodes, descriptive and analytical themes were devel-
oped.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Our literature search retrieved 153 articles after de-du-
plication and eight grey-literature documents (as shown 
in figure 2). Articles were mainly excluded if they did 
not focus on CHEs or applied a significantly different 
definition of CHEs than this review does, if they did not 
focus on communicable diseases and if they gave no 
indications of any risk factors. Twenty-two articles were 
included directly from searches with an additional four 
articles retrieved from the reference lists of included 
Figure 1 Search strategy in Medline.







ealth: first published as 10.1136/bm




4 Hammer CC, et al. BMJ Glob Health 2018;3:e000647. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2017-000647
BMJ Global Health
articles. Articles were predominantly in English. One 
article was in Spanish and one in French.
Twelve main clusters of risk factors were identified 
that all exhibit a high level of inter-relatedness, feedback 
loops and interaction on various levels. These risk factor 
clusters provide an analytical lens and many individual 
risk factors can be grouped into primary and secondary 
(and sometimes even tertiary) clusters. Table 1 gives an 
overview of the included articles, the setting they describe 
and the risk factor clusters identified in them.
Main risk factor clusters
 ► WASH2 10–23: Water, sanitation and hygiene are central 
elements to limit the risk of communicable diseases 
in populations experiencing an emergency. As such, 
they are also central to CHEs and often in a more 
precarious state than in other emergencies. WASH 
risk factors include issues such as lack of safe drinking 
water,2 10 12 14–17 19–21 lack of hygiene,10 15 19 22 hygiene 
behaviour,18 21 22 lack of soap,2 19–21 24 lack of bed nets25 
20 (as vector control is usually seen as a part of WASH 
in humanitarian response) and general water scar-
city,2 10 12 14–17 19–21 as well as lack of adequate sanita-
tion and latrines. These factors considerably increase 
the risk for diarrhoeal diseases and compound risks 
for other types of communicable diseases especially if 
they are coupled with other risk factor categories such 
as overcrowding and mass population displacement.
 ► Overcrowding2 10 13 15 17–20 22–24: Overcrowding in CHEs 
is usually a function of either mass population 
displacement or entrapment. While overcrowding 
can also be an issue in ad hoc shelters after the wide-
spread destruction of homes and infrastructure, 
it is more prevalent if populations are forced to 
become refugees or internally displaced persons and 
are forced into camps. Overcrowding affects both 
hygiene-related diseases, such as diarrhoeal diseases, 
but also increases the transmission rate of diseases 
such as measles and other infections that spread from 
person to person.
 ► Mass population displacement2 10 12 14 15 17–20 23 24 26–34: 
Mass population displacement is a trigger for most 
risk factor categories and as such possibly the main 
risk factor in CHEs. Mass population displacement 
is usually associated with large numbers of people 
moving into camp settings, often associated with 
overcrowding, inadequate shelter and poor WASH 
conditions.2 10 15 17–20 29 Additionally, populations are 
displaced into regions and areas with insufficient 
resources and services and with potentially increased 
contact of naive populations with new disease vectors. 
Early camp structures (such as layout of tents and 
siting of toileting areas) can lead to further compli-
cations. Early layout often develops as an ad hoc 
response to mass population displacement but may 
prove completely unsuitable as the camp expands.
 ► Nutrition2 10 12 13 15 17 19 20 22–24 34: While nutrition factors 
such as malnutrition,2 10 13 15 17 19 20 22 24 34 food short-
ages2 10–12 17 19 and exposure to contaminated food19 20 
are mainly risk factors at the individual level, they 
also pose increased risk to populations as a whole if 
a sufficient percentage of the population is exposed. 
Nutrition factors are related to increased suscepti-
bility to communicable diseases with resulting greater 
shedding and transmission to others. At the popula-
tion level, nutritional factors can exacerbate other 
risk factors and risk factor clusters, for example by 
Figure 2 Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses diagram. IBSS, International Bibliography of 
Social Sciences.
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Table 1 List of articles included in the analysis
Article Setting Risk factor clusters
Abubakar et al22 South Sudan; Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) camps
Infrastructure, economy, mass population 
displacement, nutrition, overcrowding, water, 
sanitation and hygiene (WASH)
Bompangue et al26 Democratic Republic of Congo; mainly 
refugee camps
Humanitarian response, mass population 
displacement
Brennan and Nandy10 Complex emergencies Health and public health services, HIV-specific risk 
factors, humanitarian response, insecurity, mass 
population displacement, nutrition, overcrowding, 
WASH
Burkle18 Complex emergencies Infrastructure, mass population displacement, 
overcrowding, living conditions, WASH
Burkle24 Complex emergencies; paediatric 
populations
Economy, health and public health services, mass 
population displacement, nutrition, overcrowding, 
WASH
Chaignat and Monti12 Complex emergencies Environment, health and public health services, 
humanitarian response, living conditions, mass 
displacement, nutrition, WASH
Close et al13 Complex emergencies Nutrition, overcrowding, mass population 
displacement, health and public health services, 
WASH
Connolly et al2 Complex emergencies Economy, environment, health and public health 
services, HIV-specific risk factors, infrastructure, 
insecurity, mass displacement, living conditions, 
overcrowding, nutrition, WASH
Coulombier et al14 Complex emergencies Health and public health services, insecurity, mass 
population displacement, WASH
Cuadrado and Gonzalez23 Complex emergencies Environment, WASH, insecurity, mass population 
displacement, nutrition, overcrowding, health and 
public health services, living conditions, economy, 
infrastructure
Fisher et al15 Complex emergencies Environment, health and public health services, HIV-
specific risk factors, mass population displacement, 
overcrowding, living conditions, nutrition, WASH
Goma Epidemiology Group 
(1995)
Rwanda; refugee camps Environment, WASH
Guthmann et al16 Sudan; IDPs WASH
Howard et al27 Afghanistan Economy, mass population displacement, health 
and public health services
Howard et al25 Afghanistan Economy, infrastructure
Khaw et al28 Complex emergencies Health and public health services, HIV-specific risk 
factors, insecurity, mass population displacement
Kolaczinski (2005) Afghanistan Health and public health services
Kolaczinski et al (2005) Afghanistan Insecurity, health and public health services
Kolaczinski and Webster 
(2003)
East Timor Health and public health services, mass population 
displacement, overcrowding, living conditions
Leyenaar30 Complex emergencies Economy, HIV-specific risk factors, insecurity, mass 
displacement
Liddle et al31 Somalia Economy, infrastructure, health and public health 
services, insecurity, mass displacement
MMWR (2011) Horn of Africa Mass population displacement, health and public 
health services
Continued
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increasing the risk of violence and social unrest. Root 
causes for nutrition risk factors lie mainly in other risk 
factor clusters such as insecurity and armed conflict 
or mass displacement and inadequate humanitarian 
response.
 ► Living conditions2 12 19 20 23: Poor living conditions are a 
combination of inadequate shelter, overcrowding and 
other individual factors in the immediate surround-
ings of an individual or group of individuals. A  key 
risk for people uprooted from their normal lives in 
CHEs and subject to inadequate resources and shelter 
is indoor air pollution.2 19 20 This is due to indoor fires, 
both for cooking purposes and for heating.2 19 20
 ► Insecurity2 10 14 19 23 28 30 31 33 35: Insecurity is a multifac-
eted bundle of risk factors that is one of the main root 
causes for increased mortality (all causes) in complex 
humanitarian emergencies. Insecurity is composed 
of factors such as armed conflict,10 social disrup-
tion10 19 30 33 and political instability.2 The specific 
nature of insecurity differs from complex emergency 
to complex emergency. However, by our (UNOCHA) 
definition, most, if not all, complex emergencies 
experience a high level of severe violence either 
from inter-state or from intra-state conflict. Insecurity 
triggers other factors such as a lack of an adequate 
humanitarian response as it poses risks to aid workers 
and inhibits access to beneficiaries. Additionally, 
it also inhibits access for the population to health 
services and has a high potential to disrupt all other 
services.
 ► Infrastructure2 18 19 22 23 31: Due to insecurity and also 
in some cases long-term neglect and lack of funding, 
infrastructure in CHEs is often inadequate, espe-
cially in response to mass influx of people either 
in camps or in the community. Lack of infrastruc-
ture also often comes with a lack of domestic coor-
dination,2 19 31 which additionally inhibits efficient 
coordination with international response. A lack 
of resources,2 31 water,2 10 12 14–17 19–21 electricity,19 
funding22 and staff22 makes the affected population 
more dependent on an international response.
 ► Humanitarian response10 12 26 34: By our (UNOCHA) 
definition, a complex emergency demands a multi-
faceted, multiagency international humanitarian 
response. However, poor response can itself become 
a risk for the spread of communicable diseases. Prob-
lems can lie with the response itself, due to a lack of 
international commitment or a lack of professionalism 
of the responding agencies and organisations.12 Prob-
lems can also arise domestically due to restrictions by 
governments or warring parties, unsafe conditions 
in which aid workers cannot properly work without 
unacceptable levels of risk for themselves or lack of 
access for various reasons.10 34 This also includes lack 
of organisational motivation22 and poor institutional 
support10 and complex international issues such as 
the lack of a binding legal framework for the protec-
tion of internally displaced populations.24
 ► Environment2 12 15 19–21 23 34: Environmental factors can 
increase the likelihood of communicable diseases 
outbreaks, and this is true beyond the context of 
CHEs. However, many environmental factors, which 
would not have mattered otherwise, can be triggered 
by mass population displacement, especially if popu-
lations are displaced into areas with a higher preva-
lence of environmental risk factors. Environmental 
risk factors include weather and climate factors, 
such as cold and dust storms,2 20 but also vector habi-
tats,19 20 34 increased contact with animals19 20 and 
endemic diseases.2 12 19 Mass population displacement 
potentially puts people at risk from these factors 
and also exacerbates the factors themselves due to 
the additional stress placed on the local environ-
ment by camps and by an influx of large numbers of 
people, often accompanied with significant land use 
changes.19
Article Setting Risk factor clusters
Salama and Dondero33 Complex emergencies HIV-specific risk factors, insecurity, mass population 
displacement, health and public health services
Toole and Waldman17 Complex emergencies and displacement 
crises
Health and public health services, mass population 
displacement, overcrowding, living conditions, 
nutrition, WASH
WHO34 Complex emergencies Environment, health and public health services, 
humanitarian response, mass population 
displacement, nutrition
WHO20 Afghanistan and neighbours Environment, health and public health services, 
living conditions, mass displacement, overcrowding, 
nutrition, WASH
WHO19 Liberia Economy, environment, health and public health 
services, HIV-specific risk factors, infrastructure, 
WASH, insecurity, living conditions, mass 
population displacement, overcrowding, nutrition
Table 1 Continued 
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 ► Economy2 19 23 25 27 30 31: While economic factors such as 
poverty and lack of resource are certainly issues that 
are important in humanitarian emergencies, they 
are not of the highest importance in CHEs. Poverty 
and economic degradation have the ability to further 
exacerbate the root causes of the underlying conflict 
but only indirectly increase the likelihood of commu-
nicable disease outbreaks.
 ► Health and public health services2 10 12–15 17 19 20 23 24 27–29 31–36: 
Breakdown of health and public health services is 
probably one of the main risk factors for commu-
nicable diseases in CHEs both for individuals 
and for populations. Lack of access to health and 
medical care is a key risk factor for severe progres-
sions of most communicable diseases for the indi-
vidual.2 10 12 15 17 19 20 28 29 31 33 34 It also facilitates the 
further spread of communicable diseases such 
as tuberculosis and makes detection of cases and 
outbreaks harder. Additionally, in complex emer-
gencies, public health services including vaccination, 
communicable disease prevention and control meas-
ures, and surveillance are no longer available making 
disease outbreaks more likely, harder to detect and 
harder to control.2 10 12 13 15 17 19 20 24 27 31–33 35 This 
breakdown of services can be seen as a function of 
the underlying conflict but is further compounded if 
there is not enough political will to provide adequate 
health protection.2
 ► HIV-specific risk factors2 10 15 19 28 30 33: HIV is a unique 
and often overlooked concern in CHEs. While many 
of the aforementioned risk factors also apply to HIV, 
there are some very specific additional risk factors 
that are associated with an increase in the incidence 
of HIV in complex emergencies. Key risk factors for 
an increased transmission of HIV include sexual and 
gender-based violence,2 10 15 19 28 30 33 increased rates of 
sex work,2 10 19 28 30 33 use of unsafe blood products and 
conflict-related increased demand for (potentially 
unsafe) blood products,2 19 28 lack of infection control 
in healthcare facilities,2 19 28 lack of condoms2 28 and 
an increased use of illicit drugs.19 28 33 A high sexu-
ally transmitted infection prevalence can be linked 
to an increased risk of contracting HIV.15 Lack of 
healthcare access and lack of antiretroviral therapy 
increase the likelihood of vertical transmission,30 and 
mass population displacement can lead to increased 
contact (sexual and otherwise) with populations with 
a higher prevalence.10 28 33
Risk factor cascades
The risk factor clusters as well as individual risk factors 
often interact and exacerbate one another. Some risk 
factors and risk factor cluster are particularly likely to 
start risk cascades, especially mass population displace-
ment (as illustrated in figure 3) and insecurity (as illus-
trated in figure 4).
One of the key mechanisms for driving risk factors 
for communicable diseases in complex emergencies 
is mass displacement (as shown in figure 3), espe-
cially mass displacement into camp settings.18–20 Camp 
settings enforce a high dependence on outside support 
for the residents. This makes residents more at risk for 
other risk factors. Mass displacement can reduce access 
to healthcare and even if access to healthcare is main-
tained the level and quality might be poor.2 10 15 17 18 Mass 
displacement thus tends to trigger all risk factors asso-
ciated with lack of access to healthcare and increases 
the risks for communicable diseases both at individual 
and community levels. This is often coupled with living 
conditions that are conducive to increased transmis-
sion of communicable diseases and put the individual 
more at risk.2 12 19 20 This includes the lack of adequate 
shelter, which is especially prone to increase vector-borne 
diseases and respiratory diseases, especially in areas with 
cold temperatures.2 10 15 17 19 20 24 29 Overcrowding—often 
together with inadequate shelter and lack of sufficient 
Figure 3 Mass population displacement cascade. WASH, water, sanitation and hygiene .
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WASH—increases the likelihood of triggering hygiene 
risk factors and also the transmission rate of respiratory 
infections and diseases such as measles. For respiratory 
infections, this is further exacerbated by conditions that 
lead to the use of indoor fires and subsequent indoor air 
pollution.2 19 20
Additionally, as human populations become more 
overcrowded, transmission of infections becomes more 
efficient, that is, the reproductive ratio (R0) of the infec-
tion increases.37 As R0 increases, the threshold immu-
nisation coverage needed to achieve herd immunity 
also increases.38 Consequently, immunisation coverage 
that was previously sufficient is inadequate to prevent 
outbreaks. One of the main problems, especially in 
overcrowded camps, is the provision of safe water and 
adequate hygiene. If WASH conditions deteriorate, 
especially diarrhoeal disease risk increases considerably. 
Any insufficiency in WASH is more pronounced when 
coupled with high population density, as experienced in 
camp situations. However, mass displacement, even when 
not coupled with displacement into camps, also triggers 
additional risk factors. Displacement can be into areas 
with endemic diseases to which the displaced popula-
tion has no immunity.12 Additionally, mass displacement 
makes populations vulnerable to environmental factors 
as well as reinforcing these.12 21 Mass displacement can 
exacerbate insecurity and therefore reignite a vicious 
circle leading to further displacement and breakdown of 
healthcare, services and infrastructure.
Insecurity itself, whether exacerbated by mass displace-
ment or not, is an important triggering mechanism for 
communicable disease risk factors in CHEs (as shown in 
figure 4). Insecurity, including political instability, armed 
conflict and social disruption, destroys services that previ-
ously prevented the spread of communicable diseases or 
disallows access to these services by making accessing them 
unsafe.2 10 14 19 28 30 31 33 36 39 40 This is particularly important 
for healthcare services that in the last few years have 
increasingly become a target of armed conflict and attacks, 
decreasing the safety of both staff and patients.41–43 Addi-
tionally, disease prevention programmes are likely to be 
disrupted and infrastructure to be destroyed.15 17 20 36 With 
regard to humanitarian response, which can under certain 
circumstance step into the place of previously govern-
ment-provided services, insecurity makes an adequate 
humanitarian response difficult.10 34 Not only will access 
to affected populations be difficult, especially in situations 
when insecurity and active fighting lead to entrapment 
or even to siege situation, as recently seen in Syria and 
Iraq, but insecurity also poses risks to aid workers’ security 
both for domestic/national and international/expatriate 
staff.10 34 Aid organisations are—understandably—increas-
ingly reluctant to accept very high risks to their personnel, 
leading to gaps in provision of services, which would other-
wise have been filled by a humanitarian response. Insecu-
rity also increases the risk of the loss of domestic experts in 
disease prevention due to injury, death and flight.42
These are only some aspects of two of the many mech-
anisms by which CHEs drive risks for communicable 
diseases. We identified further cascades triggered by 
economics and infrastructure and risk factor cluster inter-
action for WASH and health systems risk factors. However, 
the level of complexity in these types of emergencies 
makes it impossible to capture all levels of interaction 
adequately. It is not so much that complex emergencies 
create different risk factors than other humanitarian 
crises but that they exacerbate any individual risk factors 
and compound interaction effects. Levels of risk factors 
will invariably be higher in a complex emergency and 
the amount of interacting risk factors creates a ‘perfect 
storm’44 where a multifaceted, well-funded and logis-
tically and politically highly integrated humanitarian 
response is not possible due to political, financial or secu-
rity reasons. These conditions make the danger of one 
or more outbreaks of communicable diseases extremely 
high.
Figure 4 Insecurity cascade.
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While complex humanitarian emergencies do not 
trigger risk factors that are unknown in other types of 
emergencies and disasters, they produce much higher 
levels of risk and often tend to trigger more of the 
known risk factors as well as risk factor cascades. Risk 
factors related to poor sanitation and hygiene,45–52 nutri-
tion,46 53–55 mass population displacement and over-
crowding47 53 56–60 have been discussed extensively in the 
academic literature as being important in most types of 
emergencies, while risk factors resulting from an inad-
equate humanitarian response, armed conflict and a 
breakdown in government services are generally more 
associated with complex emergencies and other situa-
tions linked to failing statehood, such as civil war.
The question remains of how to make useful this infor-
mation on risk factors and their interactions. While many 
of the risk factors and even starting points of risk factor 
cascades are addressable, the context of a complex emer-
gency often prevents any such interventions. A key first 
step in any attempt to address these issues in a given 
complex emergency is a rapid but thorough initial needs 
assessment,3 61–63 including an assessment of the most 
critical risk factors present in that specific complex emer-
gency in order to develop an evidence-based intervention 
strategy. However, it is unclear how to best undertake 
such a needs assessment. Moreover, beyond the develop-
ment of evidence-based risk assessment and management 
methods, there is a need for more rigorous research into 
the operational and structural barriers that make it diffi-
cult to address risk factors in CHEs.
Limitations
This systematic review included subjective interpretation 
as risk factors were rarely the main focus of the included 
articles. Authors do not always clearly describe the risk 
factors and their mechanisms. This introduced an inter-
pretative and subjective element within the included 
articles, which became more subjective due to the level 
of interpretation required to complete the thematic 
synthesis. However, the authors maintained constant 
feedback to one another and discussed challenges, inter-
pretations and limitations to ensure reliability and validity 
of the findings to the degree that a qualitative analysis 
allows. We are therefore confident that our interpreta-
tion properly reflects the data, although agreeing that 
other interpretations are possible and may be equally 
valid. This review was necessarily a qualitative synthesis 
as the evidence base (heterogeneous and qualitative in 
nature) did not support quantitative analysis.
CONCLUSION
CHEs pose a significant threat to public health. The 
described cascades, interactions and feedback loops are 
only some of the most striking examples. The increased 
exposure to very many interacting risk factors and the 
resulting risk factor cascades created by a complex 
emergency encourages a perfect storm of communicable 
diseases risk.
However, despite these extremely increased risks and 
the exceptional situation that CHEs pose, we did not find 
a correspondingly high level of academic engagement 
with the issue. Most of the included articles discussed 
situations of mass displacement into camps, which is 
arguably the best studied situation concerning complex 
emergencies. However, conflicts like Syria and Yemen 
demonstrate that this might not be the most important 
situation in the 21st century. Syria and Yemen feature 
high levels of entrapment,64–67 as they are character-
ised by limited or no displacement due to a lack of safe 
humanitarian corridors. This situation coincides with 
a high level of most other risk factors, especially lack 
of access to healthcare, lack of humanitarian response, 
lack of WASH and other services, food insecurity and 
high levels of insecurity. We conclude that more rigorous 
research on the risk of communicable disease outbreaks 
in complex humanitarian emergencies could elucidate 
opportunities to either prevent or better manage such 
events. Such research should be undertaken in collabo-
ration between practitioners and academics. More CHE 
research on entrapment situations is especially desirable, 
in response to the nature of recent conflicts.
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Abstract  
Background: Humanitarian emergencies including disasters associated with natural hazards, conflict, complex 
emergencies and famines can pose significant risks to public health, especially when they lead to population 
displacement into inadequate conditions. To reduce the risk of communicable disease outbreaks in such situations 
it is necessary to know the key risk factors, their thresholds (quantitative risk factors only) and their relative 
importance in different types of emergencies.  
Methods: We conducted a three-stage structured expert elicitation. Experts from the fields of health protection 
and humanitarian assistance were invited to complete three successive online questionnaires. Experts were asked 
to choose the 20 most critical risk factors and in subsequent rounds to determine thresholds for urgent (yellow 
threshold level) and critical action (red threshold level). Additionally, experts were asked to assign weights for the 
risk factors in different emergency types.  
Results: We identified 20 key risk factors, which include factors related to water, sanitation and hygiene, access 
to health care, vaccination, nutrition, political will and others. Nine out of the 20 risk factors were quantifiable, 
for those risk factors yellow and red thresholds are given. 11 risk factors were qualitative. All risk factors scored 
highly when weighted in different emergency types and differences between risk factor weights in different types 
of emergencies were limited.  
Conclusion: Communicable disease risks in humanitarian emergencies are a nexus of complex and often 
interrelated individual issues. Knowing key risk factors and their thresholds and weight in different types of 
emergencies can help guide emergency response and risk reduction efforts. 
Keywords: communicable diseases, humanitarian emergencies, expert elicitation, risk factors, prioritisation 
 
Introduction: 
Communicable diseases are one of the primary 
concerns in humanitarian emergencies and disasters. 
(1-20). Humanitarian emergencies include disasters 
associated with natural hazards such as earthquakes, 
floods and tsunamis, as well as man-made disasters 
such as famine, conflict and complex emergencies. 
These emergencies usually require a large-scale 
international response and affect large proportions of 
a community, country or region. The importance and 
overall risk of communicable diseases and 
communicable disease outbreaks differs between 
different disaster types. It is particularly low in geo-
disasters such as earthquakes or volcanic eruptions 
(21), higher for flooding (14-20), and much worse 
again in refugee crises (2, 4-8, 10-12, 22) or complex 
humanitarian emergencies (1, 23).  
While the problem of a potentially increased risk of 
communicable diseases in humanitarian emergencies 
is well documented, information on specific risk 
factors and the levels at which these risk factors 
become critical is lacking. Yet, the identification of risk 
factors and their interaction is crucial for risk 
management. Knowing the overall risk profiles can 
help identify those sites where proactive interventions 
may reduce the impact of communicable diseases. Key 
risk factors for communicable diseases identified in 
the academic literature can be broadly grouped into 
categories such as Water, Sanitation and Hygiene 
(WASH), health and public health system, 
environment, humanitarian response, infrastructure, 
insecurity, living conditions, nutrition, mass 
population displacement and economy (23). Within 
those broader categories, individual risk factors are 
defined more specifically, although the categories 
themselves serve as general risk factors as well (1, 2, 
23-33). While similar groups of risk factors have been 
identified as significant for all emergency types, their 
weights can differ depending on the individual setting, 
as does the overall risk of a communicable disease 
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outbreak. For example, as Floret et al. (21) noted, the 
risk of communicable disease outbreak is almost 
negligible in geo-disasters that do not trigger a 
secondary disaster such as a displacement crisis. For 
each site, it is also important to know which risk 
factors are of the most pressing concern to allocate 
resources correctly and prioritise interventions. 
In this paper, we summarise the results from three 
stages of structured online expert consultations we 
performed to determine the 20 most critical risk 
factors (across all types of humanitarian emergencies), 
the thresholds for those factors that could be assessed 
by a quantitative indicator, and their weights in 
different types of emergencies. These data were later 
used in the development of a rapid risk assessment 
tool to be used by non-experts to assess needs and 
priorities in humanitarian emergencies. The factors 
selected to be the 20 most critical were included in the 
tool and the thresholds and weights for each factor 
were used as the basis for a risk score for each factor 
and a combined overall risk score. The risk factors 
identified, their weights and thresholds, and especially 
the rapid risk assessment tool do not substitute 
detailed needs assessment and are designed to rapidly 
assess communicable disease outbreak risk and, as 




We conducted a three-stage structured expert 
elicitation.  
 
Recruitment and participants 
Participants who self-identified as having 
experience in health protection and/or humanitarian 
assistance were invited to take part. Participants were 
recruited by email through dedicated listservs that 
cover areas such as health protection, public health 
intelligence, humanitarian assistance and disaster 
studies as well as through the personal and 
professional contacts of the research team. 
Participants were then guided to an online 
questionnaire. 
Recruitment included personalised emails to 16 
individuals we knew professionally and via dedicated 
relevant listservs. Recipients were encouraged to share 
with interested colleagues. Most of the targeted 
individual recipients had recent field experience 
supporting response to humanitarian disasters. Table 
1 lists the affiliations of targeted individuals and the 
specific list serves; most affiliations were with public 
health agencies, charitable aid organisations and/or 
research institutions. Many targeted respondents had 
multiple relevant affiliations. To help assure 
confidentiality we did not ask during the survey for 
identifying information such as current employer, job 
title or years of experience. The specific Email listservs 
we used and characteristics of the individuals we 
personally asked to fill in the survey are listed in 
Table 1.  
Questionnaires are included in the supplemental 
files. Participants could fill out one or more of the 
three stages of online questionnaires. Participation in 
a previous questionnaire was not required to take part 
in the second and/or third stages. The first 
questionnaire asked participants to identify the 20 
most critical risk factors from a list compiled based on 
the wider literature and a recent literature review by 
the research team (23). The first questionnaire also 
asked participants to assign weights (on a scale from 
0-5) to each risk factor to allow the calculation of a 
weighted average for each factor. The weighted 
average was calculated from the mean score of level of 
importance (on a scale from 0-5) times the number of 
participants selecting this weight for this factor. 
Weighted averages were calculated in case the initial 
mechanism for selection of the 20 most critical factors 
based on how many participants considered them to 
be in the top-20 proved to be inconclusive. In the 
second questionnaire, participants were invited to 
assign yellow (urgent, action required) and red 
(critical, action required immediately) thresholds for 
all quantifiable risk factors.  
The third and final questionnaire sought to identify 
the respective weights (on a scale from 1-5) of the 20 
most critical risk factors in nine different types of 
emergencies, as broadly described by Spens and 
Kovács (34). The types of crises were: famine (F), 
complex emergency (CHE), conflict (C), refugee and 
IDP camp (RC), flooding (FL), geo-disaster (GD), 
protracted crisis (PC), tropical storm (TC) and 
tsunami (T). Complex emergencies describe situations 
in which widespread internal or external conflict has 
led to a complete breakdown of authority and 
widespread damage to society. They are defined by 
requiring a multi-facetted, multi-agency international 
response (23, 35). Conflicts include inter- and intra-
state warfare, civil war and insurgency. Geo-disasters 
include earthquake, landslides, volcanic eruptions and 
other disasters caused by geological hazards. Flooding 
refers to fresh water flooding. Tropic storms include 
Hurricanes, Typhoons, Cyclones and similar hydro-
meteorological hazards. This list of types of 
emergencies was not meant to be complete or to 
comprise mutually exclusive types of crises. 
Displacement crises are usually an additional 
humanitarian emergency secondary to conflicts, 
complex emergencies, or disasters associated with a 
natural hazard. However, we believe the risks for 
communicable disease outbreaks differ significantly 
enough for these to form distinct categories. 
 
Analysis 
Answers were collected online and analysed in 
Microsoft Excel. Weighted averages, median and 
mean scores were calculated where appropriate. 
Additionally, correlations were done in SPSS version 
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Table 1. Email list servers (n=11), with affiliations and characteristics of targeted individuals (n=16) 
Public Health Agencies:    
Philippine Ministry of Health, Public Health England, World Health Organisation, Unicef, UNESCO, UNRWA 
   
NGOs involved with Humanitarian response:  
Global Student Embassy, Médecins Sans Frontières, Mercy Corps Indonesia 
   
Universities or Research Institutions:   
Adnan Menderes Üniversitesi, Institute of Tropical Medicine in Antwerp, Northumbria University, Tufts 
University, University of East Anglia, Würzburg University 
   
Job titles of targeted individuals:   
Associate Professor, Consultant for WHO, Consultant in Global Disaster Risk Reduction, Director of Health 
programme, Director of Operations Research, Geostatistical Modeller, Operations Researcher, Professor, 
Research Fellow, Researcher, Senior Fellow, WASH cluster coordinator, Water Coordinator, Water Hygiene 
and Sanitation Officer 
   
Email List servers   
German Disaster Research Listserv JISCMAIL Health Geography Listserv 
Healthcare Information for All listserv JISCMAIL Public Health Listserv 
JISCMAIL Medical Sociology Listserv JISCMAIL Disaster Research Listserv 
JISCMAIL Disaster Research Listserv JISCMAIL Global Health Listserv 
JISCMAIL Public Health Listserv Humanitarian Listserv 
Society of Apothecaries Healthcare Information for All listserv 
Results 
Responses 
The first questionnaire was completed by 21 
participants; the second questionnaire was completed 
by 24 and the last questionnaire by 25 persons. We only 
stored, recorded and analysed completed 
questionnaires and not those left half-completed in 
order to comply with the possibility for participants to 
withdraw consent to partake until the end of the survey. 
Given that the surveys were advertised widely, this 
represents a relatively small proportion of possible 
respondents. However, it is not possible to characterise 
the actual response rate. 
 
Risk Factors 
The first questionnaire sought to identify the 20 
most critical risk factors, irrespective of the emergency 
type and their relative importance. The 20 risk factors 
chosen by the most respondents (see column ‘Selected 
(n)’ in Table 2) were input to the Stage 2 and 3 surveys. 
19/20 of these also had the overall highest weighted 
average scores (see Table 3). 
 
Thresholds 
Table 4 shows the expert-identified yellow and red 
thresholds for the nine quantifiable risk factors. A 
yellow threshold indicated a situation of concern that 
should be addressed as soon as possible while a red 
threshold indicated a highly critical situation that 
needs to be a top priority. These thresholds are 
described individually below. 
Access to clean water was measured in litre per 
person per day. The median red threshold was 2 (mean 
5.25, SD 5.01) litres and the median yellow threshold 
6.5 (mean 10.5, SD 8.92) litres. 
The available number of hospital beds per 10,000 
persons was used as a proxy indicator for the risk factor 
health care facilities. The median red threshold was 5 
beds (mean 18.77, SD 27.28) per 10,000 persons and 
the median yellow threshold was 20 beds (mean 45, SD 
54.70) per 10,000 persons. 
The median red threshold for functioning toilets 
was 4 (mean 4.92, SD 4.95) toilets per 100 persons and 
the median yellow threshold was 9 (mean 10.86, SSD 
11.74) toilets per 100 persons. 
The number of health professionals per 10000 was 
measured in three categories. The median red 
threshold for doctors per 10000 persons was 1.5 (mean 
19.21, SD 35.24) and the median yellow threshold was 
5 (mean 27.31, SD 55.91) doctors per 10000 persons. 
The median red threshold for nurses was 6 (mean 
96.79, SD 256.24) per 10000 persons and the median 
yellow threshold 10 (mean 63, SD 111.29) nurses per 
10000 persons. The median red threshold for 
community health care workers was 8.5 (mean 15.86, 
SD 26.18) per 10000 persons and the median yellow 
threshold was 20 (mean 42.46, SD 55.51) community 
health care workers per 10000 persons. 
Vaccination coverage was measured for the 
following four diseases: measles, meningococcal 
meningitis, polio and hepatitis B. The median red 
threshold for measles vaccination coverage was 75 % 
(mean 67.21, SD 23.46) and the median yellow 
threshold was 90 % (mean 81.92, SD 14.88). The 
median red threshold for meningococcal meningitis 
vaccination coverage was 72.5 % (mean 62.21, SD 
23.92) with a median yellow threshold at 80 % (mean 
73.08, SD 21.53). The median red threshold for polio 
vaccination coverage was 75 (mean 64.31, SD 25.89) 
percent with a median yellow threshold of 87.5 % 
(mean 83.33, SD 12.80). The median red threshold for  
Hepatitis B vaccination coverage was 50 % (mean 
52.00, SD 23.90) with a median yellow threshold of 
72.5 % (mean 70.83, SD 17.42). 
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Table 2: List of the selected 20 most critical risk factors irrespective of emergency type and setting. Participants (n=21) were 
asked to select 20 factors out of the given 59 options. 
 
Risk factor Selected, n (%) 
Included in stage 2-3 
surveys 
No access to clean water 19 (90.48) Yes 
Lack of functioning toilets 19 (90.48) Yes 
Exposure to disease vectors 17 (80.95) Yes 
Lack of waste management 17 (80.95) Yes 
Lack of health facilities 16 (76.19) Yes 
Lack of health professionals (doctors, nurses, community health workers) 16 (76.19) Yes 
Insufficient vaccination coverage 15 (71.43) Yes 
Poor health status of the population 15 (71.43) Yes 
Extreme poverty 15(71.43) Yes 
Overcrowding 14 (66.67) Yes 
Lack of medicines 12 (57.14) Yes 
Insufficient nutrient intake 11 (52.38) Yes 
Lack of health education 11 (52.38) Yes 
Inadequate distance between housing etc. and human waste disposal 11 (52.38) Yes 
Ongoing conflict 11 (52.38) Yes 
Population displacement 11 (52.38) Yes 
Lack of organisational and political will to address public health problems 11 (52.38) Yes 
Flooding (waste water) 10 (47.62) Yes 
Breakdown of government services 10 (47.62) Yes 
Reluctance to follow recommended procedures to limit disease spread 10(47.62) Yes 
Lack of disease surveillance 9 (42.86) No 
Inadequate shelter 9 (42.86) No 
No soap 8 (38.10) No 
Local endemicity of key communicable diseases 8 (38.10) No 
Lack of trust in health care provided 7 (33.33) No 
Flooding (fresh water) 7 (33.33) No 
Environmental vulnerability 7 (33.33) No 
Local endemicity of disease vectors 7 (33.33) No 
Inequalities 7 (33.33) No 
Political instability 7 (33.33) No 
Lack of electricity 6 (28.57) No 
Illiteracy (among target recipients of aid) 6 (28.57) No 
Unsafe burial rites 5 (23.81) No 
Breakdown of authority 5 (23.81) No 
Displacement into camp(s) 5 (23.81) No 
Low levels of education (among target population) 5 (23.81) No 
Indoor fires/air pollution 4 (19.05) No 
Sexual and Gender-based Violence 4 (19.05) No 
Increased contact with domestic animals 3 (14.29) No 
Flooding (sea water) 3 (14.29) No 
Very high temperatures 3 (14.29) No 
Lack of belief in germ model – preference for other explanations of diseases 3 (14.29) No 
Ethnic rivalry 2 (9.52) No 
Seismic risk (dry mass displacement) 2 (9.52) No 
Landslide risk (wet mass displacement) 2 (9.52) No 
High precipitation 2 (9.52) No 
Very low temperatures 2 (9.52) No 
Violence 2 (9.52) No 
Increased contact with wildlife 1 (4.76) No 
Temporary housing (not tents) 1 (4.76) No 
Drought 1 (4.76) No 
Dust storms 1 (4.76) No 
De-forestation 1 (4.76) No 
Economic stagnation 1 (4.76) No 
Competition for resources 1 (4.76) No 
Arms proliferation 1 (4.76) No 
Lack of fuel for cooking or heating 1 (4.76) No 
Housing in tents 0 (0) No 
Volcanic risk 0 (0) No 
 
Poverty was measured in percentage of the 
population living below 1 $ US per person per day. The 
median red threshold was 20 % (mean 29.07, SD 25.70) 
and the median yellow threshold was also 20 % (mean 
28.27, SD 22.88). 
Overcrowding was measured in the number of 
persons living per 100 square metres (m2). The median 
red threshold was 10 (mean 20.58, SD 22.28) persons 
per 100 m2 and the median yellow threshold was 5 
(mean 13.09, SD 14.53) persons per 100 m2. 
Nutrition was measured in kcal per adult per day. 
The median red threshold was 1000 (mean 1009.30, 
SD 742.52) and the median yellow threshold was 1750 
(mean 1716.67, SD 692.62) kcal per adult per day. 
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These figures – especially the seemingly ‘high’ figure 
for the yellow threshold must be understood in the 
context of the impact of mal- and undernutrition for the 
severity of communicable disease outbreaks through 
mechanisms such as increased susceptibility and 
greater shedding and transmission. Poor nutritional 
status is a common attribute of affected populations in 
many humanitarian emergencies and is known to 
exacerbate the size and severity of communicable 
disease outbreaks. (1, 24, 36-38). 
The median red threshold for the distance between 
human waste disposal and housing was 20 metres 
(mean 71.00, SD 138.53) and the median yellow 
threshold was 50 metres (mean 79, SD 89.60). 
 
Table 3. Weighted averages of the importance of the risk factors in humanitarian emergencies and disasters, irrespective of 
emergency type and setting. 0= Not selected/not important; 1= A little important; 2= Important; 3= Quite important; 4= Very 
important; 5= Extremely important. Green indicates those factors included in stages 2 and 3 while the factors marked in red 
were discarded after stage 1. 
Risk factor 0 1 2 3 4 5 Weighted 
Average 
Included 
No access to clean water 2 0 0 0 3 15 4.35 Yes 
Lack of functioning toilets 2 0 2 1 8 7 3.7 Yes 
Lack of health facilities 5 0 1 0 7 7 3.25 Yes 
Lack of health professionals (doctors, nurses, community health workers) 5 0 1 2 3 9 3.25 Yes 
Extreme poverty 5 0 1 3 4 7 3.1 Yes 
Insufficient vaccination coverage 6 0 1 3 3 7 2.9 Yes 
Exposure to disease vectors 4 0 4 3 4 5 2.9 Yes 
Lack of waste management 4 0 1 6 7 2 2.9 Yes 
Poor health status of the population0 6 0 0 4 8 2 2.7 Yes 
Lack of medicines 9 0 0 2 4 5 2.35 Yes 
Overcrowding 7 0 2 4 7 0 2.2 Yes 
Ongoing conflict 10 0 0 3 3 4 2.05 Yes 
Lack of organisational or political will to address public health problems 9 0 2 3 2 4 2.05 Yes 
Insufficient nutrient intake 9 0 2 2 5 2 2 Yes 
Inadequate distance between housing, etc. and human waste disposal 9 0 1 3 7 0 1.95 Yes 
Flooding (waste-water) 11 0 0 1 5 3 1.9 Yes 
Lack of health education 9 0 1 6 3 1 1.85 Yes 
Population displacement 10 0 2 0 7 1 1.85 Yes 
Breakdown of government services 10 1 2 2 2 3 1.7 Yes 
Inadequate shelter 11 0 2 3 1 3 1.6 No 
Inequalities 13 0 0 0 5 2 1.5 No 
No soap 13 0 1 0 3 3 1.45 No 
Lack of disease surveillance 12 0 1 3 3 1 1.4 No 
Reluctance to follow recommended procedures to limit disease spread 11 0 2 4 3 0 1.4 Yes 
Political instability 13 0 1 1 3 2 1.35 No 
Local endemicity of key communicable diseases 13 0 1 2 3 1 1.25 No 
Flooding (fresh water) 13 0 1 2 4 0 1.2 No 
Local endemicity of disease vectors 14 0 1 1 1 3 1.2 No 
Environmental vulnerability 13 0 2 2 2 1 1.15 No 
Lack of electricity 14 0 1 2 2 1 1.05 No 
Breakdown of authority 15 0 0 1 2 2 1.05 No 
Lack of trust in health care provided 14 0 0 4 2 0 1 No 
Illiteracy (among target recipients of aid) 14 0 1 3 1 1 1 No 
Displacement into camp 5 0 1 1 2 1 0.9 No 
Low levels of education (among target persons) 15 0 0 3 1 1 0.9 No 
Sexual and Gender-based Violence 16 0 0 1 2 1 0.8 No 
Indoor fires/indoor air pollution 16 0 0 2 1 1 0.75 No 
Increased contact with domestic animals 17 0 0 1 2 0 0.55 No 
Unsafe burial rites 16 0 2 1 1 0 0.55 No 
Ethnic rivalry 18 0 0 0 1 1 0.45 No 
Flooding (salt-water) 17 0 1 1 1 0 0.45 No 
Very high temperatures 17 0 0 3 0 0 0.45 No 
Lack of belief in germ model – preference for other explanations for disease causes 17 0 1 1 1 0 0.45 No 
Violence 18 0 0 1 0 1 0.4 No 
Seismic risk (dry mass displacement) 18 0 1 0 0 1 0.35 No 
Very low temperatures 18 0 0 1 1 0 0.35 No 
Increased contact with wildlife 19 0 0 0 0 1 0.25 No 
Landslide risk (wet mass displacement) 18 0 1 1 0 0 0.25 No 
High precipitation 18 0 1 1 0 0 0.25 No 
Drought 19 0 0 0 0 1 0.25 No 
Economic stagnation 19 0 0 0 0 1 0.25 No 
Arms proliferation 19 0 0 0 0 1 0.25 No 
Dust storms 19 0 0 0 1 0 0.2 No 
De-forestation 19 0 0 0 1 0 0.2 No 
Lack of fuel for cooking or heating 19 0 0 0 1 0 0.2 No 
Temporary housing (not tents) 19 0 1 0 0 0 0.1 No 
Competition for resources 19 0 1 0 0 0 0.1 No 
Housing in tents 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 No 
Volcanic risk 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 No 
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Weights in different emergency types 
Weights for the different risk factors were similar 
for different types of emergencies, with only minor 
differences (see figure 1 and tables 5 and 6). On a scale 
from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important) all 
included risk factors score above 4 (both mean and 
median) when combining all emergencies. The only 
two risk factors with a median of 3 were ‘insufficient 
nutrient intake’ and ‘lack of health education’ in the 
context of a tropical storm. Mean values for all risk 
factors in all different emergency types (not combined) 
remained above 3.4, except for ‘lack of health 
education’ in the context of flooding (mean 3.29, SD 
1.14, median 4) and ‘lack of health education’ in the 
context of a tropical storm (mean 3.22, SD 1.28, median 
3). This suggests a reinforcement of the importance of 
these risk factors across different humanitarian 
emergency types.  
There was considerable correlation between risk 
factors, demonstrating the highly interactive nature of 
risk and risk factors in humanitarian emergencies as 
well as the complexity of such situations (see table 7).
 
Table 4. Summary of yellow and red thresholds for 9 quantifiable risk factors. 
Risk Factor  Threshold Min Max Median Mean SD n 
Clean water in litre per person per day Yellow 0.00 30.00 6.50 10.50 8.92 16 
Red 0.00 15.00 2.00 5.25 5.01 20 
Hospital beds per 10 000 persons Yellow 5.00 200.00 20.00 45.00 54.70 13 
Red 1.00 100.00 5.00 18.77 27.28 13 
Functioning toilets per 100 persons Yellow 1.00 50.00 9.00 10.86 11.74 14 
Red 1.00 20.00 4.00 4.92 4.95 13 
Doctors per 10 000 persons Yellow 1.00 200.00 5.00 27.31 55.97 13 
Red 0.00 100.00 1.50 19.21 35.24 14 
Nurses per 10 000 persons Yellow 1.00 400.00 10.00 63.00 111.29 13 
Red 0.00 1000.00 6.00 96.79 256.24 14 
CHW per 10 000 persons Yellow 1.00 200.00 20.00 42.46 55.51 13 
Red 0.00 100.00 8.50 15.86 26.18 14 
Measles vaccination percentage Yellow 40.00 95.00 90.00 81.92 14.88 13 
Red 1.00 90.00 75.00 67.21 23.46 14 
Meningitis vaccination percentage Yellow 10.00 90.00 80.00 73.08 21.53 13 
Red 1.00 85.00 72.50 62.21 23.92 14 
Polio vaccination percentage Yellow 45.00 95.00 87.50 83.33 12.80 12 
Red 1.00 90.00 75.00 64.31 25.89 13 
Hepatitis B vaccination percentage Yellow 20.00 90.00 72.50 70.83 17.42 12 
Red 1.00 90.00 50.00 52.00 23.90 13 
Persons living under 1 $ US 
percentage 
Yellow 1.00 60.00 20.00 28.27 22.88 11 
Red 1.00 80.00 20.00 29.07 25.70 14 
Persons per 100 square meters Yellow 1.00 50.00 5.00 13.09 14.53 11 
Red 1.00 75.00 10.00 20.58 22.28 12 
Kcal per adult per day Yellow 800.00 3500.00 1750.00 1716.67 692.62 12 
Red 1.00 2500.00 1000.00 1009.30 742.52 13 
Distance housing and human waste 
disposal (meters) 
Yellow 10.00 300.00 50.00 79.00 89.60 10 
Red 1.00 500.00 20.00 71.00 138.53 11 
 
 
Table 5. Median values for the weights of the selected risk factors in different types of emergencies 
Risk Factor F CHE C F GD PC RC TS T 
No access to clean water 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Lack of functioning toilets 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Exposure to disease vectors 4.5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Lack of waste management 4 4 4 4.5 4 5 5 4 4 
Lack of health facilities 4.5 5 5 4.5 5 5 5 5 5 
Lack of health workers 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 
Insufficient vaccine coverage 4.5 4 4 4 4 4.5 5 4 4 
Poor health status 5 5 4.5 4 4 5 4.5 4 4 
Extreme poverty 4.5 4 4 4 4 5 4.5 4.5 4 
Overcrowding 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 
Lack of medicines 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 
Insufficient nutrient intake 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 3 4 
Lack of health education 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 
Inadequate distance between housing and human waste disposal 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 
Ongoing conflict 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 
Population displacement 4.5 4 5 4.5 4 5 5 4.5 4 
Lack of organisational and/or political will to address public 
health problems 
5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 
Flooding (waste water) 4 4 4 5 4 4.5 4 5 5 
Breakdown of government services 5 4 5 4.5 4 5 4.5 4 4 
Reluctance to follow disease control procedures 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.5 4 4 
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Figure 1: Distribution of mean weights in different emergency types 
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Table 6. Mean values for the weights for the risk factors in different emergency types (standard deviations in brackets). 
 
F CHE C FL GD PC RC TS T 
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Table 7. Correlation between risk factors (all emergency types combined) 
W = Water; T = Toilets; V = Vectors; WM = Waste Management; HF = Health Facilities; HC = Health Care Workers; VA = Vaccinations; HS = Health Status; P = Poverty; O = Overcrowding; M = Medicines; 
N = Nutrition; HE = Health Education; D = Distance between housing and human waste disposal; C = Conflict; DI = Displacement; W = Will to address problems; F = Flooding (waste water); B = 
Breakdown of government services; R = Reluctance to follow procedures 
PC = Pearson Correlation 
  W T V WM HF HC VA HS P O M N HE D C DI W F B R 
W PC 1 .522** .350** .314** .378** .306** .301** .262** .280** .310** .354** .337** .204* .336** .309** .329** .368** .363** .243** .405** 
T PC .522** 1 .463** .692** .486** .361** .357** .297** .293** .554** .482** .297** .388** .586** .400** .406** .427** .622** .367** .519** 
V PC .350** .463** 1 .507** .547** .507** .584** .420** .441** .467** .509** .423** .337** .415** .469** .474** .432** .374** .401** .592** 
WM PC .314** .692** .507** 1 .566** .447** .384** .313** .311** .539** .632** .260** .523** .623** .359** .445** .485** .495** .467** .490** 
HF PC .378** .486** .547** .566** 1 .874** .540** .453** .397** .492** .796** .432** .485** .531** .545** .500** .562** .394** .522** .549** 
HC PC .306** .361** .507** .447** .874** 1 .539** .508** .513** .484** .737** .452** .482** .467** .560** .531** .612** .289** .605** .525** 
VA PC .301** .357** .584** .384** .540** .539** 1 .611** .570** .422** .547** .525** .555** .376** .565** .519** .503** .246** .423** .628** 
HS PC .262** .297** .420** .313** .453** .508** .611** 1 .796** .544** .504** .744** .530** .301** .559** .476** .453** .193** .418** .441** 
P PC .280** .293** .441** .311** .397** .513** .570** .796** 1 .644** .449** .633** .479** .312** .593** .592** .539** .244** .553** .478** 
O PC .310** .554** .467** .539** .492** .484** .422** .544** .644** 1 .511** .503** .517** .426** .503** .524** .549** .368** .485** .475** 
M PC .354** .482** .509** .632** .796** .737** .547** .504** .449** .511** 1 .485** .619** .584** .551** .542** .642** .450** .583** .589** 
N PC .337** .297** .423** .260** .432** .452** .525** .744** .633** .503** .485** 1 .473** .399** .526** .388** .411** .192* .335** .408** 
HE PC .204* .388** .337** .523** .485** .482** .555** .530** .479** .517** .619** .473** 1 .428** .484** .406** .463** .290** .389** .503** 
D PC .336** .586** .415** .623** .531** .467** .376** .301** .312** .426** .584** .399** .428** 1 .438** .352** .370** .629** .365** .620** 
C PC .309** .400** .469** .359** .545** .560** .565** .559** .593** .503** .551** .526** .484** .438** 1 .610** .572** .271** .509** .528** 
DI PC .329** .406** .474** .445** .500** .531** .519** .476** .592** .524** .542** .388** .406** .352** .610** 1 .642** .417** .598** .531** 
W PC .368** .427** .432** .485** .562** .612** .503** .453** .539** .549** .642** .411** .463** .370** .572** .642** 1 .368** .828** .558** 
F PC .363** .622** .374** .495** .394** .289** .246** .193** .244** .368** .450** .192* .290** .629** .271** .417** .368** 1 .340** .547** 
B PC .243** .367** .401** .467** .522** .605** .423** .418** .553** .485** .583** .335** .389** .365** .509** .598** .828** .340** 1 .464** 
R PC .405** .519** .592** .490** .549** .525** .628** .441** .478** .475** .589** .408** .503** .620** .528** .531** .558** .547** .464** 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) **. Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed) 
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Discussion 
The results from the first questionnaire, regarding 
the selection of risk factors, confirm that, as suggested 
in the wider literature, WASH (39-42), health care (36, 
43), nutrition (1, 36, 37) and emergency specific risk 
factors such as poverty (44-46), displacement and 
overcrowding (1, 24, 28, 47), and (ongoing) armed 
conflict or war (48) are among the primary factors 
influencing communicable disease outbreaks in 
humanitarian emergencies and disasters. These results 
are further confirmed by the outcomes of the third 
questionnaire which indicates the high importance of 
the selected risk factors across all types of 
humanitarian emergencies. While some of the risk 
factors identified in this research were – deliberately – 
broad, additional discussion with humanitarian aid 
providers (which were not strictly speaking part of this 
research) revealed some of the most common 
interpretations of these risk factors and showed that, 
while encompassing a range of issues, they were 
interpreted similarly by all people we spoke to. For 
example, ‘breakdown of government services’ was 
generally interpreted as encompassing wider 
infrastructure issues such as transportation and roads, 
telecommunications, safety and security, and 
sometimes education. Many of these have complex 
interaction pathways (23).  
For some of the risk factors, responses included 
seemingly extreme values. Due to this we suggest, for 
any use of the data, to rely on median values rather than 
means to make sure that extremes have little effect. 
However, we are not confident enough that they are 
simply mistakes to omit them from the analysis. 
Extremes of 1 or 0 could also mean that the responder 
didn’t think this was a relevant factor. We cannot know 
why such a value was selected. If such values had been 
mentioned in interviews, it would have been highly 
interesting to know if this was a mistake or an 
intentional way to signify that a risk factor or threshold 
would – in the responder’s opinion – not have a 
significant effect on communicable disease outbreak 
risk. 
While we focused on the 20 most critical risk 
factors, this does not mean that other factors are not 
important when assessing the risk of communicable 
disease outbreaks in such situations. However, our aim 
was to establish which factors need to be priority 
concerns. We were interested in identifying 
quantitative thresholds for the risk factors that could 
support quick assessment using minimal resources and 
man-power by not requiring professional judgements.  
The argument could be raised that thresholds for many 
of these factors can be as easily obtained from the 
Sphere standards (49). However, the thresholds listed 
in the Sphere standards have important limitations if 
used for the purpose of assessing the risk of 
communicable disease outbreaks in humanitarian 
emergencies. The Sphere standards were developed to 
assess the adequacy of overall humanitarian response 
and provide general minimum standards. Thus, the 
Sphere standards are neither intended as risk 
assessment nor are they specific to communicable 
diseases. Secondly, the Sphere standards have a 
normative component, as they indicate standards that 
should be reach based on ethical considerations rather 
than those that empirically relate to changes in the level 
of risk experience. While this makes the Sphere 
standards an unsuitable comparison, it might be 
interesting to see how this difference in approach 
shapes the suggested thresholds. Sphere standards 
indicate a minimum of 15 litres of water per person per 
day. (49) Our survey found a yellow threshold for clean 
water availability at 6.5 litres per person per day. This 
difference is explained by the fact that the thresholds 
we sought to identify are only thresholds for increases 
in disease outbreak risk. A yellow threshold for clean 
water at 6.5 litres per person per day does not suggest 
that a person does not need more that 6.5 litres of water 
per day but rather that below that the risk for a 
communicable disease outbreak critically increases. 
Additionally, some of the risk factors and especially 
their measurements are simply proxies. This becomes 
clear when looking at vaccination coverage. The 
selected vaccines are not meant to be the main, the 
only, or even vaccination priorities at all in all 
emergencies but rather they are used as proxies to 
estimate the reach of vaccination programmes. 
Keeping this in mind, the measures and risk factors 
identified are entirely unsuitable to base humanitarian 
programming upon. This should follow a suitable 
method for needs assessment – which obviously 
communicable disease outbreak risk assessment, 
which the factors suggested here are meant for, is not – 
and an estimation of minimum standards based on 
internationally accepted levels such as the Sphere 
standards. 
In contrast, the thresholds identified by our surveys 
indicate precise and transferable tipping points for 
levels of risk. They are the first step towards developing 
a rapid risk assessment mechanism for communicable 
disease outbreaks in humanitarian emergencies that, 
rather than asking the person or persons completing it 
for qualitative and personal assessments of the severity 
without any indicators what this should be based on, 
uses pre-defined thresholds and risk levels against 
which a situation can be judged. Hence our thresholds 
are hopefully useful in real world risk assessment, 
because they identify specific risk thresholds using 
simple quantitative indicators. 
 
Limitations 
While we made every attempt to maximise 
participation, the main limitation of this work is the 
small number of respondents. However, it can be 
argued that the field of experts suitable for 
participation is not large. Our expert opinions are in 
line with assessments in scientific literature of the 
relative importance of different risk factors. Expert 
elicitations have their limits and are subject to biases 
(50, 51). Overconfidence in the results of expert 
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elicitations should be avoided (51). Hence, we do not 
recommend accepting the results without further 
inquiry, even if they are mostly in line with the 
literature. 
Additionally, the above-mentioned lack of 
specification and possibly blurred and broad 
definitions of some of the risk factors is a potential 
limitation. That would certainly be the case if the 
results from this research would be used uncritically to 
make decisions in the field, even if they were used just 
for risk assessment without further additional 
investigation. However, considering that we do not 
recommend using these results beyond the realm of 
risk assessment and that for risk assessment we 
considered this research to be a first stage within a 
larger research project, the results form a good starting 
point to understand expert opinion on some of the most 
critical risk factors for communicable disease 
outbreaks in humanitarian emergencies. 
 
Conclusion 
Communicable disease outbreaks remain a 
significant concern in the aftermath of emergencies 
and disasters, especially in low- and middle-income 
countries. Broadly, expert consensus seems to be that 
WASH, access to healthcare, nutrition and wider 
societal and emergency specific factors are among the 
most important indicators and risk factors for 
communicable disease outbreaks in such situations. 
These factors remain important across different types 
of humanitarian emergencies. Beyond establishing 
current expert opinion, this research also serves as a 
starting point to assess and improve risk assessment 
tools, methods and protocols for communicable disease 
risks in humanitarian emergencies and disasters. 
Current risk assessment tools, such as the WHO tool 
used in the context of the EWARN system (52, 53), also 
use individual risk factors. However, there is a strong 
need to make risk assessments clearer and more 
explicit by using, where possible, previously 
determined risk factor thresholds that can be assessed 
without expert knowledge in each domain. Ideally, this 
risk summary would be based on an independent needs 
assessment and require minimal additional primary 
data collection in the field. The expert consultation 
described in this article, combined with a systematic 
review performed in parallel (23) and additional 
research by the research team, seeks to be the basis for 
such a pragmatic, easy-to-use and novel risk 
assessment tool. No system captures the complexity 
and diversity of humanitarian emergency settings 
perfectly and even accepted international standard 
such as Sphere are under constant revision and do not 
cover all aspects of humanitarian response. However, 
such a risk assessment tool can be seen as an attempt 
to capture some of the main risk factors for 
communicable disease outbreaks in such settings, 
especially as it does not assume considerable expert 
knowledge from the person or persons using it, like the 
WHO’s risk assessment tool for communicable diseases 
in humanitarian emergencies does (52, 53). 
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Rapid risk assessment for communicable diseases in humanitarian 
emergencies: validation of a rapid risk assessment tool for 
communicable disease risk in humanitarian emergencies 
Charlotte Christiane Hammer1, Julii Brainard1 & Paul R Hunter1 
1 University of East Anglia, Norwich, United Kingdom  
Abstract 
Background: Communicable diseases pose a significant risk in humanitarian emergencies. This paper reports on 
the development and validation of a rapid risk assessment tool for communicable diseases in humanitarian 
emergencies. 
Methods: We developed a tool assessing the 20 most critical risk factors for disease outbreaks in humanitarian 
emergencies. This paper reports on the development and validation of the tool consisting of face and content 
validation with key informant interviews (n=25) and a reliability validation (inter-rater reliability test) with groups 
of volunteer aid workers (n=4 groups).  
Findings: Face and content validation confirmed the importance of rapid risk assessment methods and the 
suitability and usefulness of the developed tool. Participants without prior health protection experience were able 
fill in the tool with an accuracy of 81·25% (SD 4.08) across both scenarios (82·35% and 80·15% for scenarios 1 and 2 
respectively). Errors primarily occurred when judging the severity of risk factors that could not be captured 
quantitatively. Revisions of the tool have been made based on the validation process. 
Conclusion: The tool was successfully validated for the use in different humanitarian emergency settings and is 
suitable for users with and without experience in health protection. 
Keywords: communicable diseases, disasters, epidemiology, health protection, humanitarian emergencies, risk 
assessment 
Introduction 
Humanitarian emergencies pose a significant risk 
to human health. Communicable diseases are one of 
the primary health concerns in humanitarian 
emergencies (1-18). The outbreaks of diphtheria and 
measles among the Rohingya refugees are striking 
examples of this (19-22).  
Early identification of at-risk populations is an 
important step towards not only a better response but 
also preparedness and prevention of outbreaks, or at 
least more serious outbreaks. Rapid risk assessment is 
therefore a priority research area. The aim of this 
study was to develop and validate an easy-to-use rapid 
risk assessment tool for communicable diseases in 
humanitarian emergencies. The tool was designed as 
part of a larger project to understand vulnerabilities 
towards communicable disease outbreaks in 
humanitarian emergencies other than a disease 
outbreak. The tool development draws on the existing 
literature on outbreaks in humanitarian crises, a 
systematic review of the literature on communicable 
disease risk factors in complex humanitarian 
emergencies (23), theoretical-conceptual framework 
development (24), expert elicitation (25) and the 
validation phase. The results were used to develop a 
rapid risk assessment tool for communicable diseases 
in humanitarian emergencies. An early draft was 
further refined after reflective practice and 
deliberations with the research team prior to the 
validation and testing process described in this paper 
(see Figure 1). The tool captures data on the 20 most 
critical risk factors that indicate a heightened risk for 
communicable disease outbreaks in humanitarian 
emergencies, which fall into three categories: water, 
sanitation and hygiene (WASH), health and socio-
political. Table 1 gives an overview of the risk factors 
and their sub-factors. Table 2 gives definitions of the 
main elements of the tool. The tool is accompanied by 
a guide. The tool presents the results of the risk 
assessment both numerically – in the form of weighted 
risk scores – and visually – using a traffic light system. 
Ideally, the risk assessment should be completed 
immediately following the onset of an emergency or 
the set-up of a response operation, within the first 72 
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hours to 14 days. Subsequent iterations of the 
assessment should be repeated at regular intervals 
throughout the response and recovery phases.  
The tool differs considerably from previous tools 
such as the risk assessment matrix described as part of 
the World Health Organization’s (WHO) early 
warning system (EWARN) (26, 27). Our tool does not 
draw on a qualitative assessment of the riskiness of the 
individual factors with regard to outbreak risk nor 
does it provide an overall risk assessment of that, 
meaning that users are asked to answer questions such 
as‚ ‘how many liters of clean water are available per 
person per day?’ and the tool calculates what the 
answer means in terms of outbreak risk. Thus, this tool 
enables responders with little or no health protection 
experience to input secondary or primary data and 
obtain an evidence-based and objective assessment 
based on that data. Subjectivity is thereby eliminated 
from the risk assessment process and the only level of 
subjectivity remains in the data collection and 
evaluation thereof, not in the assessment of the 
consequences of the factors for outbreak risk. This 
should also reduce the cognitive bias often inherent in 
risk assessment processes. As such, this tool serves a 
different purpose than the WHO EWARN risk 
assessment matrix. For organisations not involved in 
health protection, the overall weighted risk score can 
be used to support their overall risk assessment. For 
organisations involved in health protection or 
coordination, the individual weighted risk scores can 
be used to prioritise response, as can the overall 
weighted risk score if the tool is done for multiple 
spatial units (e.g. sections of a refugee camp). Overall, 
the tool can be useful for smaller organisations that do 
not have extensive health protection portfolios, as well 
as as a companion for existing well-established 
mechanisms, such as WHO EWARN or similar 
mechanisms. 
The aim of the research described in this paper – 
the validation phase – was to test the validity of the 
content of the tool and its reliability. This was done in 
a structured process with tiered changes to the tool 
based on the results of previous work.
 




The first part of this study was performed remotely 
with experts from the fields of humanitarian aid and 
health protection and the second part of the study was 
performed in the field with volunteer aid workers. The 
tool that was tested was in English. The aims of this 
research were to determine the validity of the content 
of the tool and its inter-rater reliability when used by 
aid workers with no or limited expertise in health 
protection. We used mixed methods to ensure robust 
testing and optimal fulfilment of the aims. 
Study site, partners and participants 
Validity testing was done with key-informant 
interviews. This was done remotely to include a wide 
variety of participants from different backgrounds and 
geographic locations, including persons currently 
deployed in the field. The reliability testing was done 
in August 2018 in Thessaloniki, Northern Greece. 
Thessaloniki remains a hotspot for the response 
efforts to the European migration crisis and hosts 
many of the smaller and volunteer-based 
organisations. We partnered with the InterEuropean 
Hammer C, Brainard J, Hunter P. Rapid risk assessment for communicable 
diseases in humanitarian emergencies: validation of a rapid risk assessment 
tool for communicable disease risk in humanitarian emergencies. Global 
Biosecurity, 2019; 1(2). 
  
 
Human Aid Association (IHA). IHA started as an 
entirely volunteer-based organisation in 2015 and has 
since developed professional recognition. The 
organisation works with Greek and international 
partners and provides services to refugees in camps in 
Northern Greece. However, the reliability testing was 
not done specifically in the context of the migration 
crisis as the response effort in Greece is considerably 
different from other humanitarian emergencies. 
Rather, volunteers from IHA were involved to test 
whether the tool was reliable for volunteers with a 
background in humanitarian aid but not necessarily in 
medicine or health protection. 
  
Table 1. Risk factors and sub-factors (items) in tool. 
 
Category Risk Factors Sub-factor 
WASH Lack of clean water Not applicable 
WASH Lack of toilets Not applicable 
WASH Inadequate distance between housing and human 
waste disposal 
Average distance between housing and human 
waste disposal 
Shortest distance between housing and human 
waste disposal 
WASH Flooding (waste water) Not applicable 
WASH Lack of waste management Not applicable 
WASH Exposure to disease vectors Not applicable 
Health Lack of health facilities Access to health facilities 
Availability of clinics and/or health posts (or 
other primary care facilities) 
Disease surveillance 
Hospital beds 
Health Lack of health workers Doctors 
Nurses 
Community health care workers 




Health Poor health status of the population Not applicable 
Health Lack of medicines Not applicable 
Health Reluctance to follow disease prevention measures Local health professionals 
General population  
Health Insufficient nutrient intake Not applicable 
Health Lack of health and hygiene education Not applicable 
Socio-political Extreme poverty and food insecurity Not applicable 
Socio-political Overcrowding Not applicable 
Socio-political Ongoing conflict Not applicable 
Socio-political Population displacement Not applicable 
Socio-political Lack of organisational and political will to address 
public health issues 
(I)NGOs and donors 
Local and national government 
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Category Category describes the sphere of the risk factor in question. 
Risk Factor The risk factor is the factor being measured; it can have multiple sub-factors. 
Measure The measure defines how this risk factor is measured. Measures can be 
quantitative or qualitative. 
Answer The answer is the observed situation, measured either quantitatively or via 
a selection of options for qualitative factors. 
Score (0-2) The score is the quantification and standardisation of the answer (with pre-
defined categories for scores of 0; 1; and 2) 
Weight in this type of emergency (0-4) The weight is pre-determined by the selection of the emergency type. 
Weighted Risk Score (0-8) The weighted risk score is derived from the score reached and the weight of 
the risk factor in the emergency type (multiplicatory). 
Overall weighted risk score (0-8) The overall weighted risk score combines the weighted risk scores for all 
included risk factors. It works on the same scale as the weighted risk scores. 
 
Study population 
For the first part of the study, we invited 
participants with backgrounds in humanitarian 
medicine, health protection, disaster and 
humanitarian studies, and humanitarian aid. We 
interviewed 25 people. We did not determine the study 
size a priori as we agree with Sim et al. (28) that a 
priori determination of the sample size for qualitative 
key-informant interviews is wrought with problematic 
issues due to the underlying “questionable 
philosophical and/or methodological assumptions”. 
We reached saturation after 20 interviews and 
conducted another five interviews to confirm. We 
interviewed 17 people with a health background, five 
academics and three humanitarian generalists (these 
represent the primary backgrounds of the 
participants, several participants fell into multiple 
groups). Specific practitioner backgrounds included 
expertise in water, sanitation and hygiene, 
epidemiology, microbiology, health protection, 
logistics, clinical medicine and nursing. Apart from 
academics from institutions in Europe and North 
America, we interviewed participants from Public 
Health England, the WHO, Doctors Without Borders, 
the UK Public Health Rapid Support Team, the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency in Jordan and 
several other organisations. Participants were from 
Europe, Asia, Africa and North America. 
For the reliability testing we invited volunteers 
from IHA and partner organisations to take part. We 
conducted adapted focus groups with four groups of 
two participants each. Participants were from various 
countries in Europe and all had a background in 
humanitarian aid, specifically in response in formal 
and informal refugee camps with varying experience. 
Participants had no prior training in health protection, 
epidemiology or risk assessment. 
 
Validity testing 
Validity testing covered both content validity 
testing, defined as the usefulness, appropriateness, 
relevance and suitability of the tool (29), as well as face 
validity, defined by the level to which the tool actually 
measures communicable disease risk and hence a 
measure of accuracy (30). Participants were given 
access to the tool. They were asked to comment on the 
design of the tool, specifically the layout and ease of 
use, the order and inclusion of risk factors, and the 
amount of information (i.e. the length of the tool). 
Additionally, risk factors and their measurements 
were discussed individually regarding their suitability. 
The interview concluded with a discussion of the 
colour-coding system and the interpretation of the 
results given by the tool. The interviews used a mix of 
open-ended introductory questions and more detailed 
further queries. If the participants desired, they were 
provided with details on the development of the tool 
and the data sources used. Interviews were performed 
using an open-ended interview guide and responses 
were recorded on standardised response sheets. 
Response sheets were reviewed after each interview 
and key themes and repeated suggestions for 
improvement were recorded on a running document. 
 
Reliability testing 
The tool was designed so that aid workers with little 
or no experience in health protection would be able to 
consistently fill in the tool with the right information. 
This was assessed by a reliability testing with two 
fictitious scenarios (31). Participants filled in the tool 
for both scenarios – one a displacement crisis set in a 
refugee camp and the other a response to an 
earthquake. They had access to the tool, the tool guide 
and a scenario description. The tool was completed in 
pairs and inter-rater reliability testing was done based 
on the filled-in tool documents provided by the 
participants. Scenarios were modelled after real 
emergencies (mainly by combining aspects of different 
past emergencies) and authentically reflected 
situations with incomplete information. Scenarios 
were provided in written form. There was no time limit 
for participants to complete the tool but times to 
completion were recorded for each group and 
scenario. Analysis was done against an answer sheet 
and agreement with the answer sheet was recorded for 
the overall weighted risk score as well as line-by-line 
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for each individual risk factor and sub-factor. 
Accuracy was determined as inter-rater reliability 
when tested against the answer sheet. Any answer that 
was not in line with the answer sheet was considered a 
mistake, even if it consisted of a blank. We recognise 
that there are some answers that could be contested, 
hence our aim was for 70% agreement with the answer 
sheet and not higher. Potentially contestable answers 
were those that required a qualitative judgement of the 
situation. After completion of the two scenarios, all 
groups came together as one focus group to discuss the 
ease of use of the tool. Results of this discussion were 
recorded in the form of field notes and considered in 
the final changes made to the tool. 
Changes to the tool were made after each phase of 
the testing. After analysis of the reliability testing, the 
tool was finalised and is included as Supplementary 
Files 1 (digital) and 2 (print). The guide is available as 
Supplementary File 3. The two scenarios are available 




Participants generally found the tool useful, 
comprehensible and accurate (24/25). Positive 
feedback was given for the inclusion of both a print 
and a digital version of the tool. Those who suggested 
the inclusion of other risk factors agreed that the 20 
included were suitable after discussion of the data 
sources and evidence upon which the design of the tool 
was based. Suggestions for changes made by the 
participants included issues regarding the layout and 
design of the tool, the measurement of qualitative risk 
factors and the breakdown of risk factors into sub-
factors. Changes were incorporated in subsequent 
iterations of the tool.  
Specific changes were made based on the face and 
content validation. The risk factor ‘health facilities’, 
which initially only included hospital beds, was 
extended to include primary care facilities, access to 
health care and disease surveillance. For several risk 
factors, responses were broken down by groups. For 
example, ‘lack of political and organisational will to 
address public health issues’, was split into the groups 
‘local and national government’ and ‘non-
governmental organisations and donors’. A risk factor 
concerning government services was clarified into 
government and infrastructure services and broken 
down into roads/transport, communications, 
electricity and education. Minor changes were made to 
the wording of some risk factors. Additionally, for the 
digital version, a tab with a mock filled-in version was 
added to give users a visual example and risk factors 
were sorted into clusters based on suggestions from 
participants. Participants also provided detailed input 
into issues to be included in the accompanying guide, 
including the use of a smaller spatial scale where 
possible and the need to re-do the assessment if 
significant changes to the situation have occurred.  
 
Reliability testing 
Inter-rater reliability testing was done based on the 
completed tools provided by all groups for both 
scenarios (n=8). The time that the participants needed 
to complete the tool decreased with the second 
scenario, with the average time for completion being 
33 minutes and 1 second for scenario 1 and 13 minutes 
and 15 seconds for scenario 2 (see Table 3). This leads 
to the assumption that the tool is easier to use once 
participants have some experience with it. Discussions 
with the participants confirmed this assumption. 
The aim of the analysis of the completed tools was 
to test whether participants with little or no experience 
with health protection could fill in the tool and reach 
accuracy levels of 70% or greater. Participants without 
prior health protection experience were able to fill in 
the tool with an accuracy of 81.25% (SD 4·08) across 
both scenarios (82.35% and 80.15% for scenarios 1 and 
2 respectively). Answers that required a qualitative 
judgement of the situation were the most likely to be 
answered wrongly. 
 
Table 3. Completion time for both scenarios. 
 
Group Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
1 39 min 14 sec 14 min 48 sec 
2 38 min 20 sec 12 min 51 sec 
3 27 min 15 sec 12 min 30 sec 
4 27 min 15 sec 15 min 11 sec 
Average 33 min 01 sec 13 min 50 sec 
 
Scenario 1 (see Table 4) 
For 50% of the items, 100% of the groups gave the 
correct answers. For 11 items (out of 34 items in total) 
three groups gave the correct answer (75%). The final 
six items were correctly completed by less than three 
groups (50% or lower). Quantitative items were 
generally more likely to have been identified correctly 
(8 completely correct answers out of 14 quantitative 
items versus 11 completely correct answers out of 20 
qualitative items). 
 
Scenario 2 (see Table 5) 
58.82% of items were correctly answered by 100% 
of participants. 17.65% were correctly answered by 
three groups. Half the groups or less answered the 
remaining 23.53% (eight items) correctly. As in 
scenario 1, quantitative items were more likely to be 
answered correctly (92.86% of quantitative items 
answered correctly by all groups versus 35% of 
qualitative items answered correctly by all groups). 
Additional to the line-by-line and group-by-group 
analysis, the overall risk scores were compared with 
the overall risk score ascertained with the answer 
sheets (see Table 6). 
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Table 4. Item and group validation for scenario 1 (line-by-line and group-by-group comparison of the answers of all four groups 
for scenario one in comparison with the answer sheet); for each item a score of 0, 1 or 2 may be given, N/A refers to items with no 

















1 quant 0 0 0 0 0 4 100 
2 quant 2 2 2 2 2 4 100 
3a quant 1 1 1 N/A 1 3 75 
3b quant 1 1 1 1 1 4 100 
4 qual 0 0 0 0 0 4 100 
5 qual 1 1 1 1 1 4 100 
6 qual 1 2 1 1 1 3 75 
7a qual 0 2 1 1 0 1 25 
7b qual 0 2 0 1 0 2 50 
7c qual N/A N/A N/A 1 1 2 50 
7d quant 1 1 1 1 2 3 75 
8a quant 0 0 0 0 1 3 75 
8b quant 0 0 0 0 2 3 75 
8c quant 1 1 1 1 2 3 75 
9a quant 0 0 0 0 0 4 100 
9b quant N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 100 
9c quant N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 100 
9d quant N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 100 
10 qual 1 1 1 N/A 1 3 75 
11 qual 1 1 1 1 1 4 100 
12a qual N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 100 
12b qual N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 100 
13 qual 0 0 0 0 0 4 100 
14 qual 0 2 N/A 1 1 0 0 
15 quant N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 100 
16 quant 0 0 1 0 0 3 75 
17 qual 1 1 1 1 1 4 100 
18 qual 2 2 N/A N/A 2 2 50 
19a qual 1 1 0 1 1 3 75 
19b qual 1 1 0 0 0 3 75 
20a qual 0 0 0 0 0 4 100 
20b qual 1 1 1 2 1 3 75 
20c qual N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 100 
20d qual 1 1 1 1 1 4 100 
Correct 
 









Hammer C, Brainard J, Hunter P. Rapid risk assessment for communicable 
diseases in humanitarian emergencies: validation of a rapid risk assessment 
tool for communicable disease risk in humanitarian emergencies. Global 
Biosecurity, 2019; 1(2). 
  
 
Table 5. Item and group validation for scenario 2 (line-by-line and group-by-group comparison of the answers of all 
four groups for scenario two in comparison with the answer sheet); for each item a score of 0, 1 or 2 may be given, 


















1 quant 1 1 1 1 1 4 100 
2 quant 2 2 2 2 2 4 100 
3a quant N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 100 
3b quant N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 100 
4 qual N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 100 
5 qual 2 2 2 N/A 2 3 75 
6 qual N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 100 
7a qual 2 2 1 2 1 2 50 
7b qual N/A N/A 2 2 1 1 25 
7c qual 2 2 N/A 2 2 3 75 
7d quant 2 2 2 2 2 4 100 
8a quant 2 2 2 2 2 4 100 
8b quant 2 2 2 2 2 4 100 
8c quant N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 100 
9a quant 0 0 0 0 0 4 100 
9b quant N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 100 
9c quant 0 0 0 0 0 4 100 
9d quant N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 100 
10 qual 0 0 0 2 1 2 50 
11 qual N/A N/A 2 2 1 1 25 
12a qual N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 100 
12b qual N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 100 
13 qual N/A N/A N/A 2 N/A 3 75 
14 qual 2 N/A 0 2 N/A 1 25 
15 quant 2 N/A N/A 2 N/A 1 25 
16 quant N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 100 
17 qual 0 N/A 0 2 N/A 1 25 
18 qual N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 3 75 
19a qual N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 100 
19b qual N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 100 
20a qual 2 2 2 2 2 4 100 
20b qual 2 2 N/A 2 2 3 75 
20c qual 0 0 2 0 N/A 2 50 
20d qual 2 2 N/A 2 2 3 75 
Correct 
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Table 6. Overall weighted risk scores for all groups 
compared against answer sheet 
 
Group Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
1 3.67 5.00 
2 2.75 4.36 
3 2.69 6.00 
4 3.50 5.30 
Mean 3.14 5.19 
SD 0.44 0.59 
Answer Sheet 2.89 4.73 
 
Discussion 
This study successfully validated a newly developed 
tool to rapidly assess communicable disease risks in 
humanitarian emergencies. The results of the validity 
and reliability testing suggest that the tool is useful 
and appropriate for aid workers with and without 
training in health protection to rapidly assess the risk 
that communicable diseases pose in the context of 
their field deployment. While reliability testing was 
done in Greece, no part of the study was specific to one 
singular context and the tool is suitable for all types of 
humanitarian emergencies that are not caused by the 
outbreak of a communicable disease. This tool can be 
used in the following settings: conflicts and war zones, 
floods, tropical storms and other hydro-metrological 
disasters, geo-disasters such as earthquakes, complex 
emergencies, famines, tsunamis, protracted crises and 
displacement crises with displacement into refugee 
and similar camps. 
The participants’ feedback on the tool was positive 
and reflected both face and content validity. They 
determined the tool easy to use and remarked that for 
those risk factors that are not quantitative, an element 
of subjectivity remains, but that this is limited with the 
detailed descriptions in the tool guide. Based on the 
feedback from the participants the tool was modified. 
This tool can only be as reliable as the data that is 
used to fill it in. If data is missing the tool can be used 
with an incomplete data set; however, that can 
potentially lead to an inaccurate representation of the 
actual risk. Alternatively, additional data can be 
collected on the missing factors and sub-factors. While 
the tool is mainly designed to draw on already existing 
data, a suitable method for additional data collection 
would be cross-sectional surveys with random or 
cluster random sampling.  
The results from the evaluation of the completed 
tools for the two scenarios show that aid workers with 
little or no experience in health protection, risk 
assessment or epidemiology can successfully and 
adequately use this tool to assess the risk of a 
communicable disease outbreak in different types of 
emergencies. We agreed prior to field validation that a 
reliability of 70% or greater was considered suitable 
for considering the tool reliable in the field, especially 
if the main source of error was to be qualitative 
assessments. We acknowledge that some of the 
qualitative items are open for debate and as such the 
answer sheet is not as directive for them as it is for the 
quantitative items. Hence, we consider these results to 
show the adequateness of the tool.  
While the overall weighted risk scores that the 
participants calculated were higher than those from 
the answer sheet, they were close enough to consider 
the tool adequate. In relation to the overall weighted 
risk scores, we considered adequateness to be 
achieved if the overall weighted risk score of the 
answer sheet lay within one standard deviation of the 
mean overall weighted risk score achieved by the 
participants. This was the case for both scenarios (see 
Table 6). Additionally, the scores achieved by the 
participants were generally higher than the overall 
weighted risk score assumed based on the answer 
sheet and, as we consider erring on the side of caution 
to be advisable, any discrepancies between the answer 
sheet and the participants’ answers are particularly 
unproblematic is in this context. 
Based on the reduction in time for completion from 
scenario 1 to scenario 2, we assume that repeatedly 
working with the tool will increase the ease of use and 
the time needed to complete it. Familiarity with the 
tool does not seem to increase the accuracy. However, 
we assume that two scenarios are too few to make any 
substantial comments on the likelihood that repeated 
use of the tool makes an individual or group more 
accurate when using it. 
 
Limitations  
There are several limitations to this study, as well 
as to the tool itself. The tool is only suitable for certain 
emergency types. Due to the conceptual basis of the 
tool, it is not suitable for any emergency in which an 
outbreak of an infectious disease constitutes the 
humanitarian emergency, such as the 2014 West 
Africa Ebola outbreak. Additionally, the tool does not 
have a specific emergency type for entrapment crises 
or displacement crises where most of the displaced 
population(s) is displaced into urban and non-camp 
settings. Should such emergencies occur in a situation 
where one of the other emergency types – most likely 
conflict – also apply, this is the emergency type that is 
the most suitable, which will be the case for most if not 
all entrapment crises. However, should urban/non-
camp displacement be too far removed from the 
original cause of the displacement, this tool is not 
suitable. The decision to not include such situations 
was made based on the comparably limited evidence 
base for such situations and the authors call for more 
primary research into health needs and communicable 
diseases in both entrapment crises and displacements 
into urban/non-camp settings.  
As this tool focuses on the 20 most critical risk 
factors for communicable disease outbreaks in 
humanitarian emergencies, we expect that some users 
will feel that important issues are missing. Risk factors 
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were selected based solely on their ability to be a 
reliable indicator of risk and not on any other 
considerations. Issues like sexual and reproductive 
health, as well as the protection of vulnerable groups, 
are extremely important in humanitarian 
emergencies. They are not included in this tool 
because they are not among the best indicators of 
disease outbreak risk – not because they are not 
important.  
The scores calculated by the tool will be less reliable 
in situations of considerable inequity. In such 
situations, smaller spatial units should be used. If 
measures are not distributed equitably, their 
reliability and the reliability of the overall score is 
questionable.  
While the study included systematic validity and 
reliability testing, the results and hence the suitability 
and value-added of the tool will only be entirely clear 
after the tool has been used in the field for a longer 
time and in multiple occasions. Such a test was not 
within the scope of this study. We hope that over the 
next months and years, organisations and individuals 
involved in the response to humanitarian emergencies 
will make use of the tool either on its own or alongside 
other risk assessment procedures and we would 
welcome any feedback any organisations using the tool 
would be willing to provide. The small sample size of 
the inter-rater reliability test is another limitation. 
However, the consistency of the answers and 
especially of the qualitative data obtained suggests 
that despite the small sample size the results are 
reliable. Finally, the majority of our participants 
represent (international) response organisations 
rather than host countries and affected populations. 
 
Conclusion 
We attempted to develop a rapid risk assessment 
tool for communicable diseases in humanitarian 
emergencies that gave both quantitative and 
qualitative indications of risk level and could be used 
by aid workers with little or no training in health 
protection. 
The tool works as an initial assessment tool and is 
applicable across a large range of different settings. 
In some cases, specialised organisations might 
want to have a more focused risk assessment only 
looking at their own area. Thus, one hurdle is that the 
tool is interdisciplinary and it may be difficult to 
convince organisations that the tool is suitable and 
useful at first instance even if they have their own 
more detailed and subject-specific assessments. This 
applies particularly to highly specialised 
organisations. However, one of the main groups this 
tool is aimed at are smaller organisations that do not 
have extensive health protection portfolios. For those 
organisations, this tool can be empowering when used 
together with an initial needs assessment to 
understand priority areas for action both within and 
beyond their own scope. 
In the context of larger – especially country-level – 
responses, we do not see this tool as a substitute or in 
competition with well-established mechanisms such 
as the WHO’s EWARN (26, 27). Rather it is a 
companion that seeks to quantify outbreak risk (to a 
degree) and make rapid risk assessment for 
communicable diseases in humanitarian emergencies 
possible without the expert knowledge necessary to 
complete a qualitative risk assessment. Additionally, 
the results of the tool can shed light on how the wider 
humanitarian crisis is affecting health outcomes in the 
context it is completed in. 
In addition to the digital and print versions of the 
tool, it is possible to develop the tool into an app for 
mobile devices such as tablets and smartphones. The 
tool can be used as a general rapid risk assessment tool 
that users can become highly familiar with across 
different deployments, as well as be adapted for 
specific circumstances and settings. The tool and the 
accompanying guide are available in the public 
domain and the authors are available for any questions 
regarding the use and adaptation of the tool. We would 
also welcome any feedback from organisations 
adopting the tool as part of their rapid risk assessment. 
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